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IN PRIVITY WITH THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: THE
STANDING DOCTRINE, THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Russell W. Jacobs†
Abstract
This Article explores two recent Supreme Court cases—
Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc. and Golan v. Holder—and other intellectual property litigation in
the context of the standing doctrine and the public interest.
These cases present significant public policy questions, but
the adversarial nature of the courts makes them ill-equipped to
consider the multiple public interests and multiple stakeholder
perspectives. As a result, adjudication of these cases in the courts
results in propertization of the intellectual property interests, the
exclusion of non-parties from the formation of policy, and the
exhaustion of any further policy debate after the court decision.
This Article discusses these effects and proposes a publiccomment mechanism to mitigate the negative consequences.
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INTRODUCTION
Out of all the patients, researchers, advocacy groups, and
biomedical firms interested in expanding the uses of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genetic sequences for cancer screening and research, only
twenty filed suit against the owner of the patents in the gene
sequences.1 Out of those twenty plaintiffs, only Doctor Harry Ostrer
survived the defendants’ challenge to standing, and thus he alone
represented all of those interests in the litigation in which the
Supreme Court eventually invalidated the patents in the isolated gene
sequences.2 Doctor Ostrer’s case represents an emerging type of
intellectual property litigation that departs from the typical model of a
rights owner suing an infringer. In such public interest impact
litigation, the plaintiffs do not assert a private right against an alleged
infringer. Instead, they claim to protect the public domain from
encroachment by private rights holders, asserting that they stand, in
essence, in privity with the public domain. They challenge not just
one patent or copyright, but intellectual property protections which
apply broadly across categories of material.
These types of cases raise important policy questions about the
nature of the public interest in intellectual property, who may
properly advocate for the public interest, and the proper venues for
defining the public interest in intellectual property. The standing
doctrine—the jurisdictional standard that determines who may bring a
case to court—does not do a particularly good job sorting out these
issues for public interest intellectual property cases. This Article
argues that adjudication of these cases in the courts has three effects:
(1) propertization of intellectual property rights (the private capture
of public interests), (2) two-party adversarial conception of the policy
issues (the binary tendency), and (3) exhaustion of policy debate (the
finality tendency).
The private capture of public interests arises when either the
owner of intellectual property or users of that intellectual property
seek to exercise total control of the protected material. The rights
holder may attempt to enforce an expansive view of its rights.
Stakeholders meanwhile may attempt to wrest control of those rights
away from the owner, for example through public interest intellectual
property litigation. In both cases, the actors propertize the rights.
1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3
(2013) (affirming standing for Doctor Ostrer).
2. Id. (holding isolated gene sequences ineligible for patent protection under 35
U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2013)).

JACOBS

418

4/27/2014 7:36 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

Each side claims an interest in the material and wants to capture
complete ownership of that interest to the exclusion of others’
interests in the material. This approach to intellectual property
prioritizes the individual interest in the material (i.e., the property
value) at the expense of the purpose of intellectual property to benefit
the entire public.
The binary tendency refers to the dynamics that result from
deciding multi-stakeholder policy decisions in courts structured to
resolve conflicts between adversaries. In public interest intellectual
property cases, the court may either uphold the rights holder’s
exclusive interest in its patent or copyright or it may find that
intellectual property invalid—it does not have the authority to set a
new policy outside of these two options. Thus, when courts hear
cases, the binary relationship between the parties excludes
introduction of arguments about the broader implications of the
decision on the public interest. Public interest intellectual property
cases typically implicate four imperfectly aligned interests: (1) an
individual litigant’s desire to protect its private rights, (2) an
adversary’s desire to narrow the scope of those alleged rights, (3) the
macro-desire to build a large public domain from which the public
may pluck, borrow, and revise, and (4) the push for a smaller public
domain with stronger private rights to encourage the production of
more material for the public to enjoy.3 In the adversarial system,
other stakeholders, such as competitors and consumers, do not have
the opportunity to present their inputs. Courts do not issue their
decisions based on the perspectives of these non-parties, instead
allocating control of the property rights to the rights holder or to the
challenger.
The finality tendency refers to the likelihood that a court decision
will offer the final word on intellectual property policy questions,
because neither of the other branches will take up the issues raised in
the litigation. This occurs most strikingly when a court dismisses a
case for lack of standing. In such a case, the issues raised in that
litigation remain unresolved by any forum.4 The courts also finally
dispose of policy questions when they issue a decision about the
3. C.f. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2013) (where some
copyright holders would benefit from a project to mass digitize books, while other copyright
holders would disapprove of those efforts because of the potential loss of revenue).
4. See, e.g., Aharonian v. Gonzales, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449, 1454 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(granting motion to dismiss claims challenging the validity and scope of copyright protection in
software source code). Congress did not address the criticism that copyright protections should
not extend to source code.
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constitutional or statutory soundness of a protection, since the
legislative and executive branches tend not to review the policy issues
raised in public interest intellectual property litigation.5 Although
Congress could respond to a court decision by enacting legislation
that changed the policy within the confines of the decision’s
parameters, the legislature’s inaction results in the court making the
final policy decision.
This Article discusses patent and copyright cases that fit the
model of public interest intellectual property litigation, including two
recent Supreme Court cases.6 In Association of Molecular Pathology
v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (Myriad), the Supreme
Court agreed with Doctor Ostrer’s challenge to the validity of patents
for isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences, on the basis that no
isolated gene sequences should qualify for patent protection.7 In
Golan v. Holder (Golan), the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which
reinstated copyrights for certain foreign works whose terms had
already lapsed under prior law.8
Part I of this Article sets forth the concepts of intellectual
property monopolies, the public domain, and the public interest. Part
II discusses the role of standing in public interest intellectual property
litigation, exploring the impacts of standing on the formation of
intellectual property public policy. Part III proposes a public-input
mechanism in the executive and legislative branches as a way to
mitigate the challenges of attempting to formulate intellectual
property laws through the courts.

5. E.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of
Copyright Term Extension Act). Subsequent to the litigation, Congress did not address the
policy questions raised in litigation about the usefulness of the duration of copyright terms.
6. Trademark cases involving the public interest fall outside the scope of this Article,
since the public interest trademark cases have arisen under unique rules wherein a party
claiming that it represents a portion of the public that find a term disparaging or scandalous has
standing to object to registration of that term as a trademark. Lanham Act §§ 2(a), 13, 14, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1052(a), 1063, 1064 (2013); Ritchie v. Simpson, 670 F.2d 1024, 1026-28 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
7. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2113
(2013) (holding that isolated gene sequences do not qualify for patent protection).
8. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (upholding the constitutionality of
provision reinstating copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen into the
public domain).
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A. Private and Public Rights

Copyright law and patent law recognize that certain materials
should qualify for private monopolies that allow the owner to exclude
the public from unauthorized uses. Patent law grants the patent owner
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a protected
invention.9 While patents protect inventions, copyrights grant
monopolies in creative works, giving the proprietor the right, inter
alia, to exclude others from copying a protected work.10
In contrast to material protected by copyright and patent law, the
public domain consists of the entire range of information available for
use by anyone after setting aside those privileged uses of information
for which some exclusive rights exist.11 Everyone may take material
from the public domain and adapt it to create new material, thereby
continuing the creative cycle through the mining, appropriation, and
recombination of the creative fruits of the collective public.12
The public domain encompasses material in two broad
categories: material ineligible for protection and material whose term
of protection has expired. In the first category falls material not
covered by an intellectual property right. Material that does not meet
the statutory requirements of usefulness, novelty, and nonobviousness may not receive patent protection,13 nor may abstract
ideas, facts, theorems, scientific principles, indispensable expressions,
laws of nature, or natural phenomena.14 Copyright law protections do
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority makes . . . any patented
invention . . . infringes the patent.”); Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2113 (2013) (recognizing
exclusive rights that patents would confer on patentee to exclude others from isolating particular
gene sequences and creating synthetic gene sequences); Sidney A. Diamond, The Public Interest
and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 528, 532 (1980) (discussing the exclusive
rights in patents).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106 (2012) (setting forth the various creative works eligible for
copyright protection, such as literary works, musical works, dramatic works, choreographic
works, and the exclusive rights the owner holds in such works); Diamond, supra note 9, at 532
(“A copyright proprietor can prevent anyone else from copying his work, either directly or in the
form of a translation or adaptation.”).
11. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 362 (1999) (discussing permitted uses
of information in the public domain).
12. Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meaning of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV.
215, 261-62 (2002) (“A property interest gives each member of the public an equal right to adapt
and transform the material in question, thus promoting creativity.”).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
14. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (discussing exclusions from
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not extend to facts, unoriginal material or elements, clichés, material
indispensable to an idea’s expression, material not fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, and ideas themselves.15 The second category
includes material once protected by an intellectual property right, but
no longer. Patent and copyright terms expire after fixed periods;
when those terms end the materials subject to intellectual property
protection enter the public domain.16
B. A Balancing of Rights and Incentives
Patent law and copyright law share a common theoretical and
Constitutional basis. The Patents and Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution grants Congress the following authority: “To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”17 This clause recognizes that information
goods often carry high costs of production, but absent intellectual
property rights, users may exploit and share that information quite
cheaply.18 The utilitarian approach to patent and copyright law,
acknowledged by the founders of the nation, Congress and the
Supreme Court since the beginning of the Republic,19 suggests that
patent protection); Ochoa, supra note 12, at 219 (discussing the multiple “public domains”);
Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN’S
L.R. 519, 543 (2000) (discussing scientific material that forms the public domain); Paul J. Heald
and Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause
as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1166 (2000) (noting various
types of materials to which the public has always had free access).
15. Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 137,
164-65 (1993) (stating that copyright protection does not extend to unoriginal material, material
not fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and ideas not entitled to copyright protection);
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (arguing that ideas are generally
so important to the public that they must live in the public domain).
16. Ochoa, supra note 12, at 217 (“[A] large portion of the public domain consists of
inventions and works that were formerly subject to patent and copyright protection, but are no
longer.”).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (discussing the “public good” nature of intellectual
property).
19. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The limited
scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative
work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and other arts.”); Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1944) (“A patent by its very
nature is affected with a public interest. As recognized by the Constitution, it is a special
privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the Progress of Science and useful
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granting a limited monopoly that gives creators the right to exclude
users who do not pay for access to the work will encourage the
creation of new material for the public to enjoy.20 Both the public and
the creator benefit—the public from the new materials and the creator
from the exclusive rights to commercial development and
distribution.21 The production of new works serves the public benefit
of furthering human knowledge and learning through the production
of new material.22 While this monopoly exists the creator may sell
the new material free from competition, helping to assure the
recovery of the costs of production.23 The incentives in intellectual

Arts. At the same time, a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to
the right to access to a free and open market.”); H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 7 (1909) (stating that
copyright under the Constitution “is not based upon any natural rights that the author has in his
writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served. . . . [T]he policy is
believed to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and
invention, to give some bonus to authors and inventors.”); Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with
Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA
CLARA L.R. 366, 427 (2004) (“An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies
of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times
therein mentioned.”); Michael D. Davis, The Patenting of Products of Nature, 21 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 298-99 (1995) (stating that the first patent statute set forth a term
of fourteen years—equivalent to the duration of two apprenticeships—to incentivize invention);
James Iredell, Marcus IV, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J. (Mar. 1788), reprinted in 16 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 379, 382 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) (arguing in favor of ratification of the Constitution,
and pointing out that the Copyright Clause would “give birth to many excellent writings which
would otherwise have never appeared”).
20. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013) (tying up the tools of innovation by granting patents to works of nature “would be at
odds with the very point of patents, which exist to promote creation”); Golan v. Holder, 132 S.
Ct. 873, 889 (2012) (“On the one hand, [a monopoly] can encourage production of new works.
In the absence of copyright protection, anyone might freely copy the products of an author’s
creative labor, appropriating the benefits without incurring the nonrepeatable costs of creation,
thereby deterring authors from exerting themselves in the first place. That philosophy
understands copyright’s grants of limited monopoly privileges to authors as private benefits that
are conferred for a public reason—to elicit new creation. The provision of incentives for the
creation of new works is surely an essential means to advance the spread of knowledge and
learning.”); Landes and Posner, supra note 18, at 332 (stating that without copyright protection,
“[t]here would be increased incentives to create faddish, ephemeral, and otherwise transitory
works because the gains from being the first in the market for such works would be likely to
exceed the losses from absence of copyright protection”).
21. Bonito Boats, Inc. v Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“The
Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”).
22. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“Only inventions and discoveries
which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of
a limited private monopoly.”).
23. The Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
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property exclusive rights encourage the production of material that
the public may enjoy and, when the materials enter the public domain,
the public gains the benefit of unrestricted access to this material,
with the freedom to adapt and recombine material from the public
domain to create new works and inventions.24
Justifications for copyright and patent protections most often rely
on the utilitarian approach, but a natural rights theory sometimes
provides a secondary basis for these bodies of law.25 This theory
posits that the laborer has rights in the fruits of her labor.26 However,
the grant of rights must comport with the “enough and as good”
principle, according to which the author’s monopoly may not deprive
the public of the right to enjoy the common heritage which the author
mined to produce the new work.27
James Madison opined that since the creation of new inventions
benefits both the inventors and the public, “[t]he public good fully
coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.”28 However,
achieving this balance can prove to be difficult. Under the utilitarian
approach, copyright and patent law must balance the individual’s
incentive to create against the public’s desire for access to new
information.29 The narrow tailoring of the intellectual property
(characterizing “[t]he basic purpose of copyrights” as “[providing] a limited monopoly for
authors primarily to encourage creativity”); Dallon, supra note 19, at 367-68 (stating that a
monopoly provides an incentive to create works and facilitates the recovery of the costs of
creation).
24. Wendy J. Gordon, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is
Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 683 (2000) (“The public’s right is preserved in
its ability to make use of the common heritage.”); Litman, supra note 15, at 965 (“One
traditional justification for the public domain is that the public domain is the public’s price for
the grant of a copyright. The public is said to grant the copyright as an incentive to persuade the
author to create and publish original works that will enrich the public domain.”).
25. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901-02 (acknowledging “natural rights” view as a basis for
copyright protection); Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing Musical Compositions;
Copyright Term Extension; and Copyright Per Program Licenses: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 5
(1997) (“The overarching premise of copyright law is that those who enrich our culture with the
fruits of their intellect are no less entitled to be compensated than those who create more
tangible products, be they skyscrapers or computers or five-star meals.”).
26. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyrights, 84 HARVARD L. REV. 281, 284
(1970) (“The theory that authors have a natural right to the fruit of their labors is an ancient
one.”).
27. Gordon, supra note 24, at 683; Litman, supra note 15, at 965 (“When individual
authors claim that they are entitled to incentives that would impoverish the milieu in which other
authors must also work, we must guard against protecting authors at the expense of the
enterprise of authorship.”).
28. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1941).
29. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (2012) (finding that in consideration of the need to grant to
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protections should foment creative production without privatizing too
much information or keeping it private for too long.30
One may characterize this balancing as between public and
private interests, as just discussed, or as between multiple public
interests. The public has an interest in enjoying free access to
information—and therefore weak private rights.31 But the public also
has an interest in the production of new information goods for it to
enjoy and mine for the creation of even newer material, which it
would want to protect with strong private rights.32 The public
consists of individuals, all of whom have the potential to both create
and consume new information goods and therefore seek equilibrium
between these interests.33

the creator exclusive rights to encourage the production of new material versus the potential
costs for consumers arising from a monopoly, “the original British copyright statute, the
Constitution’s Framers, and our case law all have recognized copyright’s resulting and
necessary call for balance”); Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 864 (1996) (“Patent and
copyright law balance the incentive for innovation and expression against society’s interest in
the efficient dissemination of inventions and expressive works.”).
30. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013) (stating that tying up the tools of innovation by granting patents to works of nature
“would be at odds with the very point of patents, which exist to promote creation”); Stewart E.
Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1213 (1996)
(“[C]opyright is justifiable only to the extent that copyright protection is necessary to induce
additional creative activity.”); Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards
for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 301 (1966) (“[A] patent should not be granted for an
innovation unless the innovation would have been unlikely to have been developed absent the
prospect of a patent.”).
31. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property
and the Public Domain (Part II), 18 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 191, 266 (1994) (“This is the
central problem in intellectual property law: privatizing information reduces competition and
impedes widespread uses of such information.”).
32. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property
and the Public Domain (Part I), 18 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 21 (1994) (“However, if social
costs (less information consumption) from commodification start appearing to outweigh benefits
of increased information production, the specter of the information-poor world arises again in a
viciously circular fashion, pushing for the necessity of more incentives to produce more, and so
on.”) (emphasis in original).
33. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2013) (observing that some
holders of copyrights in books would approve of an effort to mass digitize those books, and
therefore facilitate broader access to a larger number of works, while some opposed those efforts
because of the loss of revenue from and control over their own works); Gordon, supra note 24,
at 683 (“In short, the authors’ rights perspective ends up saying that the copyright statute must,
to some extent, serve the public interest, which includes the interest of future creators, as well as
the public.”).
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C. The Anti-Enclosure Movement
In recent years, critics of a perceived expansion of intellectual
property rights have grown more vocal.34 This camp declares a crisis:
“[T]here are too many IP rights; they are too strong; ‘something’ has
to be done.”35 These criticisms perceive multiple attacks on the
baseline of a strong public domain and limited exclusive rights.36
Material formerly believed to belong in the commons has now
become privatized and subject to new or expanded property rights.37
For copyrights, critics have focused on term extensions.38 The
criticism against expansion of rights in the field of patents has
focused on the granting of patents for “ideas,” such as business
methods and algorithms.39 The criticisms extend to patent rights for
scientific knowledge, research tools, and, in particular, biological
materials like DNA gene sequences.40 Such genetic materials form
the “common heritage of humankind” and subjecting these materials
to private property rights introduces market forces which may have
disastrous consequences.41
To this anti-enclosure camp, the expansions suggest that the field
of intellectual property has come to over-emphasize the “property”
aspect of the rights, thereby encouraging a desire to “own” and to
privatize as much material as possible.42 This trend has resulted in a
race to claim intellectual property protections as broadly and as

34. E.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 38 (2003) (citations omitted) (noting the
“remarkable” expansion of intellectual property rights and that the limits on those rights are
“under attack”).
35. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHICAGO L. REV.
183, 183 (2004).
36. Boyle, supra note 34, at 39 (citations omitted) (lamenting the removal of facts and
ideas from the public domain); Aoki, supra note 32, at 6-7 (“These trends have increasingly
turned elements of what had heretofore been considered common culture, ideas and information
into forms of private intellectual property.”).
37. Boyle, supra note 34, at 37 (discussing the expansion of rights).
38. Gordon, supra note 24, at 676-77 (“[A]n instrumentalist is likely to doubt that
incentives will be significantly enhanced by the extra twenty years of copyright term.”).
39. Boyle, supra note 34, at 38 (2003) (citations omitted) (discussing business methods
patents); Kane, supra note 14, at 521-22 (discussing patents in algorithms).
40. Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L.
REV. 707, 725 (2004) (stating that such commodification leads to debates on “the economic
valuation of living materials”).
41. Boyle, supra note 34, at 37 (2003) (holding that the human genome “should not and
perhaps in some sense cannot be owned”).
42. Benkler, supra note 11, at 355 (discussing propertization).
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quickly as possible.43
Even if the rights expansion resulted in increased production of
new material (a point in dispute), the broader rights might impose far
greater social costs in the form of restricted circulation and
diminished competition.44 The public suffers more restrictions on the
use of existing works, which remain under private ownership outside
the public domain for longer.45 Production of new information
becomes more expensive or impracticable because of the increased
number of fragments of existing information subject to private rights,
which carry license fees, and the challenges in locating the rights
owners for material created decades earlier.46 The author or inventor
faces a paradox because he wants strong rights for his own works, but
weak rights for the material from which he borrows to create the new
material.47 Noting that something must be done, some critics have
turned to the courts.

43. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998) (“[N]obody wants to be
the last one left dedicating findings to the public domain . . . .”).
44. Merges, supra note 35, at 199 (stating that society benefits from stronger rights only
if the assets created as a result of those rights outweigh the overall costs); Yochai Benkler, Siren
Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 103 (2001)
(“[I]ncreases in the scope and reach of property rights benefit commercial producers who sell
information goods . . . .”); Jane Ginsburg, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension:
How Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651,698 (2000) (reasoning that
changing the term length probably has little incremental value to most authors).
45. Megan M. La Belle, Standing to Sue in the Myriad Genetics Case, 2 CAL. L. REV.
CIR. 68, 85 (2011) (“[W]hen private parties invalidate bad patents the public as a whole benefits
from robust competition, increased consumer choice, and lower prices.”); Heller & Eisenberg,
supra note 43, at 698 (describing the “tragedy of the anticommons”—that is, an underuse of a
resource resulting from the private rights that exclude uses by others); Melville B. Nimmer,
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranties of Free Speech and the Press?, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1194-95 (1970) (questioning the benefits of stronger copyright
protections).
46. Kane, supra note 40, at 719 (noting the chilling effect of expanded patent rights on
downstream genetic research); Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 343 (“Every potential
increase of protection, however, also raises the costs of, or reduces access to, the raw material
from which you might have built those products.”); Breyer, supra note 26, at 326 (highlighting
difficulties in locating rights holders).
47. Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 335 (“Some copyright protection is necessary to
generate the incentives to incur the costs of creating easily copied works, but too much
protection can raise the costs of creation for subsequent authors to the point where those authors
cannot cover them even though they have complete copyright protection for their own
originality.”).
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II. STANDING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A. The Doctrine of Standing
Before the courts will consider the merits of any case, including
public interest intellectual property cases, the plaintiffs may have to
withstand challenges that they do not have the right to bring the
lawsuit. The doctrine of “standing” limits the types of disputes that a
federal court has the authority to consider. Under Article III of the
Constitution, the federal courts may only decide “cases” or
“controversies.”48 The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth a three-part
test to determine if a litigant has alleged a “case” or “controversy.”
First, the plaintiff must allege that it suffered an “injury in fact—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized; and (b) actual and imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.”49 Second, a causal connection must exist between the
injury and the challenged action.50 Third, the plaintiff’s requested
relief must redress the injury.51 Even if a matter passes this threeelement test, a federal court may decline to grant standing based on
prudential concerns, such as when a litigant asserts the rights of third
parties or raises general social grievances.52
The standing doctrine serves multiple purposes.53 First, the
doctrine ensures true adversity between the litigants, each with a stake
in winning.54 Second, such litigants have an incentive to effectively
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Cases . . . [and]
Controversies.”); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (“Federal courts have
authority under the Constitution to answer such questions only if necessary to do so in the
course of deciding an actual ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”).
49. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations and
punctuation omitted); accord Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2659 (“That party must also have ‘standing,’
which requires, among other things, that it have suffered a ‘concrete and particularized
injury.’”).
50. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (holding that the litigant must establish a “fairly traceable”
causation between the injury and the conduct).
51. Id. (requiring that requested relief appear likely to redress the injury); Gene R. Nichol
Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308 (2002)
(“The articulated Article III injury standard thus demands concrete and individualized harm,
assuring that actual, consequential benefit accrues to the plaintiff from a favorable decision.”).
52. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2662 (“We have repeatedly held that such a ‘generalized
grievance,’ no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.”); William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222-23 (1988) (“If a plaintiff can show sufficient injury
to satisfy Article III, he must also satisfy prudential concerns about, for example, whether he
should be able to assert the rights of someone else, or whether he should be able to litigate
generalized social grievances.”).
53. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 222 (setting forth purposes of standing).
54. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 461, 469 (2008)
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advocate their positions and sharpen the issues before the court.55
Third, the people most concerned with the outcome of the dispute will
have the opportunity to litigate the questions at issue.56 Fourth, the
presentation of a concrete case by parties with an actual stake in the
litigation informs the court of the practical consequences of its
decision.57 Fifth, confining the court’s jurisdiction to “concrete and
particularized” disputes prevents the anti-majoritarian federal courts
from taking over the policy-making role of the popularly elected
executive and legislative branches.58 Sixth, the standing doctrine
allocates the scarce resources of the federal courts to disputes between
parties who have a real stake in the matter.59
These general standing rules apply to intellectual property cases
as well. In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., not a public-interest
case, but rather a more traditional two-party dispute, the Supreme
Court provided guidance on the standards of the standing doctrine
specifically applicable to cases seeking a declaratory judgment
(“A dispute that satisfies Article III thus has at least two sides, each of which has a stake in
winning, and the doctrine of standing ensures that the plaintiff has such a stake.”).
55. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (finding that “the gist of the question of
standing” is whether “the appellants [have] alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions”).
56. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 310 (1979)
(“The case or controversy requirement guarantees that the individuals most affected by the
challenged activity will have a role in the challenge. This guarantee should be seen as a
minimal element of the legitimacy of a legal system which imposes legal burdens upon its
members. At some point in the legal process the affected individuals should have their day in
court.”).
57. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (holding that the standing doctrine “tends to assure that the legal
questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating
society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action”); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VIR. L.
REV. 1663, 1672 (2007) (“The ‘abstract’ injury shunned by standing doctrine may lead to an
‘abstract’ presentation of the issues involved, while courts are better suited to make incremental,
fact-specific determinations.”).
58. Elliott, supra note 54, at 462 (“Cases are sorted on a rough democratic theory: if an
injury is shared by a large group of people, some cases suggest, such a group can and should
take its problem to the legislature or the executive branch, not the courts.”); Fletcher, supra note
52, at 222 (1988) (“The purposes include . . . preventing the anti-majoritarian federal judiciary
from usurping the policy-making functions of the popularly elected branches.”).
59. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000) (“Standing
doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the federal courts
are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.”); Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 881, 891 (1983) (“Standing, in other words, is only meant to assure that the courts can do
their work well, and not to assure that they keep out of affairs better left to the other branches.”).
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regarding the scope of rights in a patent: “whether the facts alleged,
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.”60
The public interest cases discussed in this article follow this
standing regime, and application of the standing rules in these
circumstances yields the three consequences of the private capture of
public interests, binary tendency, and the finality tendency. Applying
the MedImmune test in Association for Molecular Pathology v.
USPTO, the Supreme Court upheld the standing of one of the
plaintiffs who challenged the validity of the two patents for the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences on the basis that no isolated
gene sequences should qualify for patent protection.61 Doctor Ostrer
contended that he would conduct testing on the BRCA1 and BRCA2
gene sequences, except that Myriad Genetics, the patent owner,
threatened legal action.62
Emblematic of the binary tendency, the courts did not grant
standing to any of the other twenty plaintiffs—cancer patients,
doctors, genetics researchers, and medical organizations—because
either they did not have immediate plans to undertake allegedly
infringing activities (despite the declarations of two other researchers
who said they would undertake the allegedly infringing testing but for
Myriad’s general threats) or Myriad had not threatened legal action
against them specifically.63 The remaining parties in the litigation
engaged in the private capture of public interests, fighting for control
of the genetic material, with the Supreme Court ultimately
invalidating patents in the naturally occurring genetic sequences, but
upholding patents in synthetic gene sequences and diagnostic
testing.64
Standing has worked out unevenly in other recent public interest
intellectual property cases. In Organic Seed Growers and Trade

60. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (finding that a patent
licensee has standing to challenge the validity of the patent even without stopping payment of
the license fee).
61. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3
(2013) (recognizing right that patent, if valid, would confer on patentee to exclude others from
isolating particular gene sequences and creating synthetic gene sequences).
62. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1302, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
aff’d in relevant part sub nom. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115 n.3 (2013).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
agreed with the lower court that plaintiff organic farmers did not have
standing to seek a declaratory judgment invalidating defendant’s seed
patents.65 These farmers sought to invalidate defendant’s seed
patents, but more broadly, all patents for transgenic seeds, on the
basis that patenting transgenic seeds lead to effects “injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”66 Although the
defendant had initiated a large number of suits against other farmers,
those disputes differed factually from the one before the court; the
Organic Seed plaintiffs did not intend to use the seeds in question and
the defendant had publicly stated that it did not intend to sue farmers
with trace amounts of seeds on their fields.67 Emblematic of the
finality tendency, the court did not consider the substantive arguments
and the other branches have not picked up the policy question. Had
the court granted standing, the litigation would have determined who
could exert control over the seeds, again pointing to the private
capture of public interests.
Similar challenges arose in a copyright case seeking invalidation
of rights in an entire category of works. In Aharonian v. Gonzales, a
computer programmer challenged the constitutionality of copyright
protection for software source code, attempting to exert a private
capture of public interests by wresting the monopolies away from the
source code copyright owners.68 The court concluded that the
plaintiff had suffered an injury-in-fact, namely, that he had to pay
license fees to use software source code protected by copyright.69
Nonetheless, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim challenging the
protection of “ideas” for lack of standing since the court viewed that
claim as a generalized grievance.70 The court did not, however, view
the claims of unconstitutional vagueness as generalized grievances,
since the plaintiff merely sought a declaration that Congress had not
properly defined the terms essential to apply the statute to software

65. Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., 718 F.3d 1350, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
66. First Amended Complaint at 2, Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto
Corp., No. 11-cv-2163-NRB (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2011) (citation omitted).
67. Organic Seed Growers, 718 F.3d at 1352.
68. Aharonian v. Gonzales, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting motion to
dismiss claims challenging the validity and scope of copyright protection in software source
code).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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code.71 Although the court agreed that the plaintiff had standing to
assert these claims, it dismissed them for failing to state a claim,
pointing towards the finality tendency.72
In two Supreme Court copyright cases seeking to undo broad
protections, the plaintiffs had little to no problems demonstrating
standing. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),
which added twenty years to the terms of most copyrighted works.73
The question of standing did not reach the Eldred Supreme Court, but
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded
that the plaintiffs—individuals, corporations, and associations who
depended on works in the public domain (including a book
distributor, a book re-printer, a sheet music vendor, a choir director,
and a film preservation and restoration company)—had standing to
challenge the CTEA.74
The plaintiffs benefit from using works in the public domain and,
but for the CTEA, they would be able to exploit additional works
the copyrights to which would have expired in the near future. As
such, they suffer an injury in fact that is traceable to the CTEA and
75
that we could redress by holding the Act invalid.

The plaintiffs did not set forth any specific works whose
copyright they would infringe but for the copyright extension affected
by the statute.76
In Golan v. Holder, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which
reinstated copyrights for certain foreign works whose terms had
lapsed under current law.77 The Golan plaintiffs did not face any
challenges to their standing. Both cases demonstrate the binary
71. Id. (“The fact that finding copyright law unconstitutional would affect many people
does not transform plaintiff’s claim into a generalized grievance, as standing depends only on
whether plaintiff has alleged a concrete, particular harm.”).
72. Id.
73. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act).
74. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (confirming standing for
plaintiffs who might use works that would pass into the public domain but for the Copyright
Term Extension Act), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
75. Id. at 375 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992))
(standing not raised on appeal).
76. See Second Amended Complaint, Eldred v. Reno, No. 1:99CV00065 (D.D.C. June
24, 1999); First Amended Complaint, Eldred v. Reno, No. 1:99CV00065 (D.D.C. May 10,
1999); Complaint, No. 1:00CV00065 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 1999) 1999 WL 33743484.
77. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (upholding the constitutionality of provision
reinstating copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen into the public domain).
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tendency, in that the court decided a discrete question of how long
these specific rights owners would retain their monopolies, instead of
considering the question of copyright term length from the broader
policy perspective of how to maximize the production of new material
for the public to enjoy. They also show attempts to displace the
private capture of public interests from the copyright owners—who
enjoy a monopoly—to the copyright users, who want to control that
monopoly.
B. The Challenge of Standing in Public Interest Intellectual
Property Cases
Having discussed how the courts applied the doctrine of standing
to public interest intellectual property cases, this section now explores
how these cases fit with the concept of “injury in fact” and the six
purposes of Constitutionally required standing.78
1. Injury-in-Fact
Public interest intellectual property cases raise unique issues
with respect to the requirement of suffering an injury-in-fact. The
plaintiffs bring these cases seeking to rein in what they view as
excessive protections implicating broad categories of material. Yet, a
concern for the integrity of the public domain does not equate to a
traditionally recognized, concrete injury suffered uniquely by the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court recently made clear that to meet the
standing threshold, “it is not enough that the party invoking the power
of the court have a keen interest in the issue,” when it denied standing
to backers of an initiative passed by the voters of California, but
which the state government declined to defend.79 When a law creates
a general obligation to the public, individuals do not hold the private
right to enforce that law.80 Unlike some other constitutional
provisions, the Patent and Copyright Clause does not confer a private
right of action on individuals.81 Nor does the Copyright Act or Patent

78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
79. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (rejecting standing of parties
challenging same-sex marriage in California when state officials declined to defend law that
would have banned such marriages).
80. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 210 (1992) (discussing private rights of actions); Scalia, supra
note 59, at 895 (“That explains, I think, why ‘concrete injury’—an injury apart from the mere
breach of the social contract, so to speak, effected by the very fact of unlawful government
action—is the indispensable prerequisite of standing.”).
81. See Sunstein, supra note 80, at 210 (contrasting the private rights under the fourth
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Act confer a right for an individual to bring an action on behalf of the
public domain.82
The plaintiffs in Organic Seed Growers asserted injuries more
properly characterized as generally applicable to the general public.
At the heart of their case, they opposed transgenic seeds from a policy
perspective because of the potential negative effects on the food
supply.83 They did not use transgenic seeds themselves nor did they
want transgenic seeds on their farms.84 As they did not claim any past
or future interest in the protected material, they could not establish
standing, and the court declined to consider the broader policy
questions relating to transgenic seeds.85
Both economic and non-economic injuries may satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement.86 Multiple cases acknowledge social
costs, such as the economic effects of immigration regulations on jobs
in a community and the loss of enjoyment of land as a result of the
failure to enforce the Clean Water Act, as sufficient injuries to
establish standing.87 The Court has also recognized standing resulting
from “opportunity” harms—that is, the injury resulting when a
government action or omission forecloses the opportunity to enjoy
some benefit.88 In such cases, the litigant needs to characterize the
Amendment recognized in Bivins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971),
with other constitutional provisions).
82. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2012) (making no allowance for private attorney general suits);
35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2012) (same).
83. Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 555
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding no standing for seed growers despite active enforcement by the
patentee), aff’d 718 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000) (recognizing
standing for environmental advocacy organization alleging that members would suffer negative
impacts to their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests from defendant’s mercury
discharges); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court – a Functional Analysis, 86
HARV. L. REV. 645, 675-76 (1973) (“[T]he proposition now seems firmly established that
standing may stem from injury to noneconomic interests, such as aesthetic, conservational,
recreational, or spiritual values.”).
87. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181 (recognizing standing based on citizens’
perceived decrease in the “aesthetic and recreational values of the area” affected by the
challenged government action); Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 93 F.3d. 897,
900 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing standing for communities concerned about immigrants’
impact on availability of employment and impact on public services like hospitals and schools);
Northwest Forest Workers Ass’n v. Lyng, 688 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 n.2 (D.D.C. 1988) (recognizing
standing for workers concerned about guest worker program).
88. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 205 (noting the re-characterization of the injury in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), from denial to the medical school
based on race to denial to compete for all 100 spots in the class).
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injury as an increased risk of harm, rather than in traditional cause-ofaction language, since the challenged government program generally
targets broad sectors of the population and rarely will yield concrete
harms particularized to any one person.89 Public interest intellectual
property plaintiffs could characterize their injuries as opportunity
harms. Under this viewpoint, the actions of the government in favor
of a private rights holder deprive the plaintiffs of the benefit of
material which should belong in the public domain.90
Additionally, the Court, at times, has recognized expressive
harms—the harms resulting from a government action that conveys a
social meaning inconsistent with the principles valued by society,
rather than the material consequences of those actions—as injuries-infact.91 Yet, the Court has also said that expressive harms do not per
se confer standing on the claimant alleging injury.92 One may view
injuries alleged in public interest intellectual property through the lens
of expressive harms. The anti-enclosure movement’s opposition to
what its adherents characterize as increased propertization of
copyrights and patents and the shrinking of the public domain forms
the theoretical basis for many of the copyright and patent cases.93 The
plaintiffs would argue that these government actions stand opposed to
the nation’s values of freedom and a robust commons which enables
the civic discourse that fuels our democracy.
Yet, public interest intellectual property plaintiffs do not need to
resort to these characterizations in order to establish standing. These
89. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 206-07 (citing, as an example, withholding federal funding
from projects that threaten endangered species or that discriminate on the basis of race).
90. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1302, 1320 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(alleging injury resulting from inability to conduct or benefit from research and to obtain
diagnostic tests, and the high fees charged by the patentee), aff’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Golan v. Holder, 132 S.
Ct. 873 (2012) (reviewing plaintiffs’ complaint of required license fees for use of the works and
the inability to find the rights holders which would preclude their use of the works); Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (reviewing the same).
91. Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373,
395-96 (2004) (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 640 (1993)) (recognizing standing to challenge
racial gerrymandering claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause).
92. Id. at 395-96 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)) (“[T]he stigmatizing
injury often caused by racial discrimination . . . accords a basis for standing only to those
persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct.”).
93. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111
(2013) (unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene sequences, challenged for propertizing
natural material out of the public domain, but unanimously upholding the patentability of
synthetically created complementary DNA); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (upholding the
constitutionality of provision reinstating copyright protection for certain foreign works that had
fallen in the public domain).
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plaintiffs bring the lawsuits not only for ideological reasons, but
because they suffer an economic injury. The protections contested by
the plaintiffs in cases like Myriad, Golan and Eldred, might result in
harms experienced generally by the public—such as increased
propertization—but also in harms experienced solely by a small
number of individuals or entities, such as license fees, the lack of
access to material held by an unwilling rights holder, the inability to
conduct or benefit from research exploiting the patented material, and
the inability to create or benefit from derivative works to be created
from material now outside the public domain.94 When viewed from
the perspective of such individuals or entities, these cases fit squarely
within the traditional approach to articulating harm, and thus support
the recognition of their standing to bring claims arising from these
protections.
It would seem appropriate to require the plaintiff to assert an
interest in a particular protected work, even if the plaintiff’s claimed
injury arises not from rights unique to that work, but rather to broadly
applicable rights. Yet the courts did not require that the Eldred or
Golan plaintiffs identify a specific copyrighted work which they
sought to invalidate.95 In Eldred, the District Court for the District of
Columbia observed in a footnote that “[u]nless the Plaintiffs’
allegation that they prepared to use these works in some way is
untrue, the Plaintiffs have constitutional standing as the enactment of
the CTEA allegedly caused an injury in fact to their ability to use
these works that is redressable by declaratory judgment.”96
Accordingly, in the copyright cases the courts have concerned
themselves more with the aggregate impact of the challenged
legislation, rather than the injury to each of the plaintiffs.
On the other hand, the patent cases examine each plaintiff’s
standing individually, rather than based on the harms suffered by the
plaintiffs in the aggregate.97 Under this approach, threats by the
94. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1320 n.7 (reviewing plaintiffs’ alleged
inability to conduct or benefit from research and to obtain diagnostic tests, and the high fees
charged by the patentee); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 873 (addressing plaintiffs’ complaint of the
license fees for use of the works and the inability to find the rights holders which would
preclude their use of the works); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (addressing the same).
95. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (upholding the constitutionality of provision reinstating
copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen in the public domain); Eldred, 537
U.S. at 218 (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act).
96. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 n.3 (1999) (upholding Copyright Term Extension
Act), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
97. Compare Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1320 n.7 (finding standing for
one plaintiff who had received a demand letter, but no standing for other plaintiffs who had not
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patentee against third parties do not establish standing, even if the
plaintiff would undertake the activities but for the patentee’s history
of enforcement.98 The patent plaintiffs had difficulty establishing
standing because, for the most part, they had not used the patented
inventions challenged in the litigation. In contrast, the copyright
plaintiffs alleged that they currently use or have already used the
works subject to the statute.99
2. True Adversity
The doctrine of standing furthers a fundamental purpose of
ensuring true adversity between the litigants, each with a stake in
winning.100 In the public interest IP cases, true adversity depends on
how you define the injury. In the clear case, an individual or entity
has standing when the rights holder has threatened it with litigation
for using the ostensibly protected material.101 The party threatened
with litigation has a stake in winning the case—a favorable decision
by the court would result in the ability to exploit the material without
the need to pay a license fee. Courts may not even require a threat of
litigation, instead accepting the continuation of activity deemed
infringing under the law as sufficient to establish the stake in winning,
as in Golan and Eldred.102 Without either a threat of litigation or
current infringing activity, a potential litigant will face difficulties
establishing standing. For example, the patients in Myriad who
would benefit from broader research on the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes, or concert goers who want to enjoy music pulled back from the

received such letters), with Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (finding standing for a large number of
plaintiffs to challenge Copyright Term Extension Act).
98. Compare Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1320 n.7 (finding standing for
one plaintiff who had received a demand letter, but no standing for other plaintiffs who had not
received such letters) with Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., 20121298 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding no standing for seed growers despite active enforcement by the
patentee).
99. Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (upholding the constitutionality of provision reinstating
copyrights for certain foreign works that had fallen into the public domain); Eldred, 537 U.S. at
193 (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act).
100. Elliott, supra note 54, at 469 (“A dispute that satisfies Article III thus has at least two
sides, each of which has a stake in winning, and the doctrine of standing ensures that the
plaintiff has such a stake.”).
101. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1320 n.7 (finding standing for one
plaintiff who had received a demand letter, but no standing for other plaintiffs who had not
received such letters).
102. Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (upholding the constitutionality of provision reinstating
copyrights for certain foreign works that had fallen into the public domain); Eldred, 537 U.S. at
193 (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act).
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public domain after Golan, had a stake in knocking down the
extension of rights. However, because these downstream users did
not exploit the material directly, but rather consumed the fruits of
someone else’s (infringing) use, that alleged direct infringer had more
of a stake in winning the litigation.103
When a court confers standing on a plaintiff, the court
recognizes that the party has true adversity with respect to the
property right in question. Through the litigation they intend to
reduce or eliminate the costs for them to exploit the material covered
by the intellectual property protection. This position thus serves to
propertize the plaintiffs’ stance to the intellectual property, feeding
the trend of propertization criticized by those supporting the
plaintiff’s lawsuits against the broad property interests. Evidencing
the private capture of public interests, the case becomes a property
dispute—a winner-takes-all fight to keep exclusive rights or open up
the material for free use by all. Per the binary tendency, this form of
adjudication does not allow for deliberative policy-making involving
inputs from multiple constituencies with the end goal of producing
policies that enhance the welfare of the general public, policies that
balance the incentives to the inventors and authors to produce with
the public’s ease of accessing the fruits of production.
Conceiving of “true adversity” from the perspective of the
plaintiff alone does not address the other side of the dispute. An
inadequacy of adversity may arise when the defendant does not have
sufficient interest in winning the dispute or does not represent all of
the interests adverse to those of the plaintiff. The only question the
standing doctrine poses regarding defendants is whether a decision
against the defendants would redress the injury asserted by the
plaintiff, and not whether the litigation includes the most impacted
stakeholders.104 Public interest plaintiffs commonly sue an agent of
the executive branch of the federal government, such as the Attorney
General (Eldred and Golan) or the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) (Myriad).105 These defendants have the
authority to provide relief that will redress the injury, since a decision
103. See Nichol, supra note 51, at 323 (“A lot of things hurt, in one way or another.
Sometimes the harms are subjective, or regarded as such. If, however, a lot of us seem to feel
the same way, the injury moves anomalously, closer to an ‘objective’ reality.”).
104. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (requiring that requested relief
appear likely to redress the injury).
105. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(naming USPTO as defendant); Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (naming Attorney General as defendant);
Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (naming Attorney General as defendant).
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against the Attorney General would result in invalidation of the
copyright statutes and a decision against the USPTO would invalidate
a patent registration. The government may also have an interest in
assuring the proper execution of the law. However, the government
does not have any particular interest in the specific protected material
under consideration in the litigation. In the copyright suits, the U.S.
Attorney General, as the sole defendant, protects the expanded rights
of private owners.106 This role of the government as a defendant in a
binary dispute causes it to neglect its responsibility to represent the
entirety of the public interest, not just the interests held by the rights
holder or those advocating for the public domain. Accordingly, for
true adversity, the government should not substitute for the rights
holder.
While rights holders could seek to intervene in cases as
interested parties, they may not know that the litigation exists, that a
case seeking to reduce the term of copyrights has an impact on their
specific copyrights, or that a case seeking to invalidate patents
relating specifically to cancer genes would have an impact on other
gene patents.107 Even if all of the affected rights holders joined the
litigation, other interests would remain unrepresented—consumers
concerned about the price and supply of new material, patients
wanting access to new medical research, and competitors who want to
limit the scope of protection for the rights holder without imposing a
future restriction on the scope of their own rights. Representation of
all of these interests in the litigation would not guarantee effective
representation, either.
Under this landscape, plaintiffs may strategically choose which
defendants to sue—for example, an underfunded rights holder who
will have difficulty defending the action—and obtain a broad decision
with implications beyond that individual rights holder.
3. Effective Representation
Truly adverse litigants with a stake in winning have incentives to
advocate their positions.108 Effective advocacy helps to sharpen the
106. Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (reviewing Attorney General’s defense of the expanded
copyright protections); Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (same).
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (allowing for permissive joinder of anyone who “has a claim or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact”).
108. Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1706 (1980) (“The basic constitutional requirement enunciated by the
Court is that the plaintiff have a personal stake in the action sufficient to ensure a concrete and
adversarial presentation. This requirement is phrased as a means to an end: the personal stake is
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issues before the court; parties with a stake in the litigation have an
incentive to do the research and prepare the arguments for the
court.109 A litigant who has not suffered the principal injury, or who
asserts rights on behalf of a non-party, may nonetheless effectively
advocate the matter; indeed, it has suffered a significant enough
injury to motivate it to come to court.110 The fact that a party has
chosen to devote money and other resources to a dispute by initiating
litigation seems to indicate that such party has sufficiently invested in
the matter to present an effective case.111 An organization with no
personal stake in a case may offer more effective advocacy than a
person with clear standing.112 For example, a trade association could
advocate more effectively for the interests of its members than any of
the resource-constrained members could on its own.113 Nonetheless,
effective advocacy does not per se create a case or controversy.114
The connection between direct adversity and effectiveness of
representation has played out unevenly in public interest intellectual
property cases. As the theory goes, individuals who suffer a direct
injury would advocate more vigorously than those less directly
impacted by the challenged action. However, the public interest
required in that it ensures concrete adversity.”).
109. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 73, 87 (2007) (“In
our adversarial system of justice, courts rely on parties to do the work of researching issues and
making the best possible arguments for each side so that the court can reach a sound decision.
Therefore, according to this argument, it is essential that each party have a stake in the litigation
that gives it the incentive to do the necessary work.”).
110. Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party
Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 406, 454 (1981) (“I
recommend that courts permit litigants to assert the rights of third parties so long as the litigant
appears reasonably likely to represent the interests of those third parties adequately.”).
111. Siegel, supra note 109, at 89 (“If, as standing doctrine posits, a dollar’s worth of
injury sufficiently motivates plaintiffs to litigate vigorously, it would seem equally likely that
courts would receive vigorous litigation from any party who takes the trouble to sue and who
cares enough to pay the litigation costs.”).
112. Id. at 88 (“Even accepting the notion that the standing and mootness requirements
guarantee that parties will have a ‘stake’ in litigation, there is no necessary link between having
such a stake and litigating with the vigor to illuminate issues properly for the court. A litigant
with a significant stake in litigation may present poor arguments (perhaps because the litigant
has inferior counsel); a non-Hohfeldian litigant may have all the resources of a national
advocacy group behind her.”).
113. Kelsey M. Heilman, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations’
Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 237, 251-52 (2008) (citing Hunt v. Wash.
State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1977)) (discussing benefits of
associational standing).
114. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (“No matter how deeply
committed petitioners may be to upholding Proposition 8 or how ‘zealous their advocacy,’ that
is not a ‘particularized interest’ sufficient to create a case or controversy under Article III.”).
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intellectual property cases litigated thus far do not permit testing of
this hypothesis. First, the small sample size (perhaps a dozen cases)
would not yield any statistically significant conclusions. Second,
public interest advocacy groups like the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, the ACLU, and Public Patent and prominent intellectual
property scholars like Lawrence Lessig have backed all of the
Supreme Court cases identified in this Article,115 meaning that all of
the cases have involved ideological plaintiffs; the cases do not include
examples filed solely by non-ideological plaintiffs for comparison.
Third, the inconsistency in outcomes suggests that the type of
plaintiff does not correlate with the vigor of the advocacy or the
success on the merits. The copyright cases of Golan and Eldred
featured ideological plaintiffs deeply concerned about the
encroachment on the public domain threatened by copyright term
extensions, as well as individuals who faced direct economic injury
because they would have to pay more royalties or forego using certain
works and risk smaller audiences.116 Plaintiffs in both cases included
a wide range of parties who demonstrated an array of real impacts of
the challenged statutes, and boasted impressive counsel.117 Their lack
of success on the merits does not mean that they lacked a direct stake
in the matter or effective representation, merely that they did not
convince the courts that the challenged statutes failed constitutional
review. On the other hand, plaintiffs in patent disputes have
experienced more difficulties with standing.118 Yet even when only
one of twenty plaintiffs survived the standing challenge, the plaintiff
side convinced the Supreme Court to issue a sweeping decision

115. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110 (2013)
(Public Patent Foundation represented petitioners); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877 (2012)
(Stanford Law School programs represented petitioners); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191
(2003) (Lessig argued on behalf of petitioners); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702
F. Supp. 2d 181, 183 (2010) (ACLU represented petitioners); Golan v. Holder, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/cases/golan-v-holder (last visited March 28, 2014)
(EFF submitted amicus brief in Golan).
116. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (hearing plaintiffs’ concern about the
expansion of copyright and also faced increased fees to conduct their businesses); Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (hearing the same).
117. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878 (upholding the constitutionality of provision reinstating
copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen in the public domain); Eldred, 537
U.S. at 222 (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act).
118. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene sequences for the only plaintiff out of twenty
to survive the standing challenge); Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp.,
718 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of standing).
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unanimously invalidating patents in gene sequences.119 Thus, the
cases in this field do not suggest that directness of adversity has any
correlation to effectiveness of representation.
4. Most Direct Stake
Standing limits access to the courthouse so that those most
concerned with resolution of the dispute will have the opportunity to
direct the litigation.120 The Supreme Court recently denied standing
to individuals who had sponsored a California ballot initiative, which
the federal district court found unconstitutional and the state
government declined to appeal.121 The Court held that “[t]hey have
no ‘personal stake’ in defending its enforcement that is
distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of
California.”122 Going further, the Court declared that “Article III
standing ‘is not to be placed in the hands of concerned bystanders,
who will use it simply as a vehicle for the vindication of value
interests.’”123
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the outcome of litigation on
the issue may bind non-litigants who have a direct stake in the matter,
perhaps even a greater interest than those who brought the case to the
court.124 Considering the binding effect of litigation on not just the
parties, but on all those with an interest in analogous intellectual
property, the directness of impact thus should play a major role in the
determination of “true adversity.” While the direct and downstream
users share aligned interests in the instant goal of achieving access to
the rights, their broader goals might diverge.125
For instance, researchers might craft the requested relief

119. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2107 (unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene
sequences).
120. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976) (“[T]he courts should not adjudicate
such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish
to assert them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is
successful or not.”).
121. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
122. Id. at 2656.
123. Id. at 2663 (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)).
124. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1693 (recognizing the need to protect individuals’
choices about the exercise of their rights).
125. See Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309-10 (“Isn’t there a danger that by seeking to
change the law too rapidly an ideological plaintiff will take greater risks by framing the issues in
a broader, more controversial, manner? . . . The danger is that without a real client, and without
a sense of accountability to an identifiable individual, their capacity truly to represent the public
interest would be diminished.”).
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narrowly so that a court decision would not limit their ability to seek
protection for their own innovations, while patients might seek
broader relief so that they would have unrestrained access to all
downstream research. Likewise, the artists who would perform the
works pulled back from the public domain, or mine those works to
create derivative works, might seek to keep original works in the
public domain, but retain robust protections for their new works
utilizing elements from those works. Meanwhile, consumers making
individual purchases of the new works may prefer to keep all of the
works in the public domain, believing that free access to the works
would keep prices down. These consumers also have the least
invested in the matter since they may choose to purchase other goods,
and therefore may not stick with the litigation to the end or devote
sufficient resources to advocate for their position. These various
interests and viewpoints attest to the multiple competing public
interests which all inform the question of balancing the desire for a
large and free public domain versus the need for incentives in the
form of private, exclusive rights to feed that public domain.
Litigants face this challenge in all areas of law, since prior
litigation may set precedent adverse to future parties. When
confronted with seemingly adverse case law, plaintiffs may attempt to
argue that the dissimilarities in facts should lead to different results.
The particular dynamics of public interest intellectual property cases
may make such an approach less feasible. In these cases, the initial
plaintiffs may take an all-in approach, challenging the
constitutionality of a statute (such as in Eldred)126 or the propriety of
protection for entire classes of material (such as in Myriad).127 If the
court has already decided the questions of broad applicability and
invalidated protections that extend to future litigants as well, the
factual differences in cases future litigants might bring make no
difference—someone else has taken their opportunity to present the
case to the court.
To ensure that both the issues presented to the court and the
sought-after relief match the real, present-day state of affairs
implicated by the complained-of actions, the standing doctrine

126. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of
Copyright Term Extension Act).
127. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111
(2013) (affirming plaintiff’s challenge to patent protection for human gene sequences but
unanimously upholding the patentability of synthetically created complementary DNA).
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requires that the litigants live with the outcome of the litigation.128
However, to meet the standing threshold, a litigant need only establish
it has suffered an injury in fact, and meeting that threshold does not
necessarily mean that the litigant will have the most direct stake, the
most representative case, or the most effective representation.129 One
broad view of standing goes so far as to argue that the public should
have standing to bring claims when a government action expresses “a
constitutionally impermissible conception of national political
identity.”130
Such a reading would seem to encompass standing for both
patients seeking access to patented cancer diagnostic tests, as with the
patients in Myriad, and anyone else arguing that some grant of rights
interfered with society’s understanding of the balancing of interests in
intellectual property.131 The Court denied the Myriad patients
standing and, thus, the opportunity to have their viewpoints
considered (consistent with the binary tendency reducing a matter
important to multiple stakeholders to a two-party dispute). While
these constituents should have the opportunity to influence the policy
decision, they do not have as direct an interest in the dispute as others
(such as the researchers wanting to conduct testing with the gene
sequences). Viewed this way, it seems appropriate to deny standing
to the patients in favor of the researchers.
The courts could deny standing to a potential litigant, even if it
suffered a direct injury, if that individual or entity would not provide
adequate representation for others who also suffered direct injury.132
For class actions, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires that the
federal courts consider whether the proposed representative plaintiff
128. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 310 (“In fact, one of the best explanations of the case or
controversy requirement may be the desire of courts to ensure the accountability of
representatives. . . . The case or controversy requirement guarantees that the individuals most
affected by the challenged activity will have a role in the challenge. This guarantee should be
seen as a minimal element of the legitimacy of a legal system which imposes legal burdens upon
its members. At some point in the legal process the affected individuals should have their day in
court.”).
129. Siegel, supra note 109, at 92 (“Even taking the standing requirement for all it is
worth, it requires only that a plaintiff challenging governmental activity show some injury,
perhaps a trifling injury, from the challenged activity. It does not require that a suit be brought
by the most affected plaintiff.”).
130. Cox, supra note 91, at 396-97 (setting forth a view of standing based on “expressive
harms” rather than “injury in fact”).
131. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2107 (unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene
sequences; only one plaintiff, a researcher, survived the standing challenge).
132. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309 (arguing that the courts should not assume that “selfappointed ideological plaintiffs” will always provide adequate representation).
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has claims typical of the class and will adequately represent the
interests of the entire class.133 In public interest intellectual property
litigation, the court could conduct analysis similar to that applied to
representativeness inquiries in class action certification—assessing
the litigant’s character, the proximity in interests between the litigant
and the absentees, and the abilities of counsel.134
Yet, to require the courts to determine whether a plaintiff in a
public interest intellectual property case will adequately represent
those similarly situated creates significant complexities and
burdens.135 In public interest intellectual property cases, the courts do
not know the full universe of stakeholders, especially when the
plaintiffs do not bring the cases as class actions. Myriad presented a
unique scenario in which the court could choose the most directly
impacted plaintiff from a gallery of differently affected litigants.136
The court does not usually have that visibility. In the normal case,
courts cannot assess the typicality of the claims of the plaintiff or its
capacity to adequately represent the interests of those similarly
situated when the suit does not include any significant number of
other stakeholders.
A court could require the joinder of those absent individuals or
entities whose rights the litigation would impact.137 Under this
approach, the original plaintiff would now face the daunting task of
navigating a complex and massive multi-party litigation. Only wellresourced parties will choose to proceed. The self-selection of

133. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
134. Rohr, supra note 110, at 455-564 (“In determining the likely adequacy of the
representation of a class within the meaning of rule 23, courts have considered the personal
character of the representative, his interest in the litigation, and the competence and experience
of his counsel. Generally, courts may appropriately consider these factors in the context of
third-party standing as well.”); Scott, supra note 86, at 680 (“This [representativeness] inquiry
would focus not only on whether the plaintiff is able and likely to present a technically adequate
case, but also on whether his interest is sufficiently representative of that of other persons
affected by the government’s actions that the relief sought by him will adequately protect them
as well.”).
135. Scott, supra note 86, at 680-81 (“To evaluate which persons or organizations are most
representative of the interests of all those affected by the challenged government action is a task
for which courts have no suitable tools.”).
136. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2107 (unanimously rejecting patent protection for gene
sequences and finding standing for only one plaintiff, a researcher).
137. Rohr, supra note 110, at 459 (“As the situation typified by this case would fall within
the ambit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, the court should bring the third party into the
lawsuit when jurisdictionally feasible. If the court then determines that a conflict of interest
exists between the litigant and the third party, it can dismiss the suit for lack of third-party
standing . . . .”).
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litigants makes them more invested in the litigation, but does not
necessarily yield a sample representative of the entirety of interests
impacted by the policy. Given the large number of stakeholders (e.g.,
consumers, competitors) in these types of cases, mandatory joinder
would prove impracticable for the parties and court.
Even without mandatory joinder, litigation brought by
ideological plaintiff classes may efficiently showcase a wide range of
stakeholder viewpoints caused by the challenged action.138 Moreover,
ideological organizations bringing impact litigation seeking to
advance the public interest tend to put forward a lead plaintiff with
the most sympathetic facts.139 In cases of public interest impact
litigation brought by an ideological plaintiff who leads a plaintiff
class, an ideological organization that represents directly affected
constituents, or an association representing similarly situated
members, aggregating resources opens the courtroom to individuals
who might not have access otherwise and creates efficiencies
compared to bringing multiple individual suits.140 Well-resourced by
an ideological backer, a public interest class of ideological plaintiffs
may provide the most effective representation.141 Indeed, an
organization with no direct, personal stake in a particular case may
take more of an interest in that case—for ideological reasons—than a
party suffering a direct injury.142

138. Tushnet, supra note 108, at 1713 (“[I]deological plaintiffs, who usually have a
reasonably adequate commitment to continuing efforts, will do a better job of representing
absentees than will Hohfeldian litigants.”).
139. Id. at 1713-14 (“[A] public interest litigant will rarely fail to present a sufficiently
concrete case. The lore of public interest litigation is replete with tales of trying to find the
‘best’ plaintiff, that is, the one on whom the legal rule to be challenged operates in the most
heart-rending way.”).
140. Heilman, supra note 113, at 251-52 (“Organizations have resources and expertise that
their members lack. . . . In addition, individuals often face significant economic and other
barriers to bringing suit in the adversarial system, especially when those individuals have
limited resources or claims for only small damages.”); Ann M. Southworth, Collective
Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM.
L. REV. 2449, 2450 (1999) (“Aggregating claims sometimes increases access to the legal system
for individuals who otherwise would be unable to find representation. Achieving systemic
change benefiting large numbers of people often is more efficient than seeking redress for each
of many aggrieved individuals.”).
141. Marie A. Failinger and Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and
Group Representation, 45 OHIO STATE L.J. 1, 17 (1984) (“[T]he class suit can secure relief for
the client that is not only longer-lasting but also broader-based.”); Tushnet, supra note 108, at
1713-18 (discussing the advantages of a class of ideological plaintiffs).
142. Heilman, supra note 113, at 251-52 (“Where a member of the organization has an
actual injury and the expert organization has an interest in litigating the claim, the quality of the
organization’s case presentation will potentially exceed that of the individual plaintiff.”); Scalia,

JACOBS

446

4/27/2014 7:36 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

The potential benefits of ideological plaintiff classes rest upon
the assumption that the interests of all of those injured by the
challenged action will align.143 Divergence of interests may occur in
all multi-party litigation, but the nature of public interest intellectual
property cases, which contend with four imperfectly aligned interests
(rights holder, rights user, large public domain, and strong private
rights) and multiple stakeholders, makes them particular susceptible
to this occurrence. The Second Circuit noted in dictum that a
proposed class of all holders of copyrights in books reproduced by
Google, Inc. as part of its library project would most likely contain
members who opposed the project, but also members who benefit
from the project and therefore would disapprove of the plaintiffs’
efforts.144
The jointness problem recognizes this possibility of diverging
interests.145 In the case of a large, diffuse, and disorganized class,
ideological lawyers may end up driving the case strategy and
objectives.146 An ideological plaintiff may take aggressive steps to
push the limits of the law, and therefore lose sight of the immediate
needs of those suffering the direct injury.147 The dominant plaintiff
may also define the objectives and strategy of the litigation to the
detriment of the other litigants or non-litigants.148 Non-parties and
supra note 59, at 891-92 (“Often the very best adversaries are national organizations such as the
NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union that have a keen interest in the abstract question
at issue in the case, but no ‘concrete injury in fact’ whatever.”).
143. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1677 (“But it also follows that individuals can attach
different values to such injuries, and that these values may be positive or negative. This has
important implications.”); Failinger and May, supra note 141, at 17 (“Law reform proponents
have argued that emphasis on the group impact of cases, that is, the aggregate effect of a given
case on the poor as a group, is the most effective way to combat the causes of poverty which
invidiously affect individual poor persons.”).
144. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing class
certification since the fair use defense might resolve the issues in the case).
145. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1693 (“The inability to disaggregate governmental
conduct that affects many at once will be called the jointness problem. . . . Understanding the
jointness problem allows one to recognize another public-minded function of the injury-in-fact
requirement: protecting individuals’ choices about the exercise of their rights.”).
146. Southworth, supra note 140, at 2451-52 (“Lawyers representing individuals in law
reform litigation and lawyers handling class actions generally reported that they played more
significant roles than did lawyers representing organizations or individuals where there was no
law reform component.”); Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309-10 (discussing potential lack of
accountability of lawyers to real clients in public interest litigation).
147. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309-10 (discussing potential lack of accountability of
lawyers to real clients in public interest litigation).
148. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1677 (“If values can be either positive or negative, the
ideological plaintiff’s interests may be opposed to the interests of other entitlement-holders
within the class. This can present problems because the ideological plaintiff is in effect
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minority class members may find their interests unrepresented before
the courts.149
Faced with this possible divergence of strategies, the best
resourced stakeholders may rush to the courthouse to define the
litigation according to their own interests.150 The courts could
become a battleground over multiple competing viewpoints on the
public interest. Liberal standing rules make this possibility more
likely, since more stakeholders will meet the standing threshold.
Setting a higher evidentiary threshold to establish that the plaintiff
represents a public interest would help to address the problem of
claims brought with inadequate representation.151 However, meeting
such a standard would require the court and the parties to invest a
substantial amount of time and money to gather, review, and test the
evidence of representativeness. This use of resources contravenes one
goal of the standing doctrine—to engage in a threshold inquiry at the
early stages of the dispute before the expenditure of significant
resources.
Even assuming that a plaintiff could establish the typicality of its
position among the relevant population, should that shared belief
entitle it to bring the action? Disapproval of a government policy,
even widely shared disapproval, does not compel a conclusion that
the policy contradicts the public interest. In some public interest
litigation, the claims clearly align with an explicit statutory purpose of
furthering a specific public interest, and the statute gives the general
public certain rights of action to enforce that purpose (e.g.,
minimizing pollution).152 By contrast, the intellectual property
statutes do not express one explicit, enforceable public interest

determining the disposition of the entitlements of the class as a whole.”).
149. Id. at 1678 (“Even if the dissenting class were small, identifiable, and closed, strategic
behavior could foil socially valuable action because any one entitlement-holder exercises veto
power over a government program that involves the entitlements of many.”).
150. Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y FORUM 39, 79 (2001) (“In a sense, liberalized standing
for citizen suits creates a new commons problem with over-litigation replacing overgrazing.”).
151. See Lynda J. Oswald, Challenging the Registration of Scandalous and Disparaging
Marks Under the Lanham Act: Who Has Standing to Sue?, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 251 (2004)
(questioning the adequacy of extrinsic evidence to support a claim that a mark disparages a
plaintiff’s beliefs).
152. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 169 (2000) (recognizing
standing for environmental advocacy organization alleging that members would suffer negative
impacts to their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests from defendant’s mercury
discharges).
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purpose.153 Without that express statutory charge, the public interests
underlying the statutes remain open to debate.
Accordingly, claims brought on behalf of a public interest should
arouse skepticism, and prompt the courts to pause to consider whether
the self-appointed defender of the public domain actually represents
the public interest. Assuming that the plaintiff does present a
plausible claim in support of a public interest, does that same plaintiff
or another party in the dispute represent the other public interests?
Can the plaintiff speak to the effects of the challenged action for
restraints on speech, the incentives to produce new materials, the
impact on competitors, and the costs incurred by consumers? It
seems unlikely that any one representative or even a class of litigants
could represent all of these interests.
5. Concrete Cases Illustrate Real Consequences
Standing serves the further purpose of illuminating the realworld effects of the challenged action on individuals to the court.154
“The ‘abstract’ injury shunned by standing doctrine may lead to an
‘abstract’ presentation of the issues involved, while courts are better
suited to make incremental, fact-specific determinations.”155 In this
way, the standing doctrine requirement “tends to assure that the legal
questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action.”156
Public interest litigation tends to present plaintiffs with concrete
cases because the counsel seeks lead plaintiffs who illustrate the
consequences of the challenged action in a sympathetic and
compelling manner.157 Public interest litigation specific to intellectual
property claims raises special challenges with respect to the
153. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1301 (2012) (setting forth protections afforded under the
Copyright Act and available causes of action, but not any enforceable public benefit); 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2012) (setting forth the same).
154. Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 309-10 (“Isn’t a traditional plaintiff better able vividly to
illustrate the adverse effects of the complained-of activity?”).
155. Kontorovich, supra note 57, at 1672 (discussing real-world effects rationale).
156. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). See also Helen Hershkoff, Public Law Litigation: Lessons and
Questions, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS REV. 157, 164 (2009) (“[G]iven the indeterminacy of legal
norms, adjudication helps to create public meaning by providing a public space in which diverse
actors have an opportunity to collaborate in the light of on-the-ground knowledge and local
context.”).
157. Tushnet, supra note 108, at 1713-14 (1980) (discussing ideological lead plaintiffs).
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illustration of real consequences. Namely, one plaintiff will present a
narrative about the immediate effects it will experience as a result of a
copyright term extension or the granting of a patent for a gene
sequence. The case proceeds based on the story of that one narrator at
that one moment in time. Consistent with the binary tendency of
reducing these issues to two-party property disputes, the case does not
explore the more sweeping saga of the widespread or longer-term
effects of more or less restrictive intellectual property protections.
The discrete impact of one seed patent on one farmer does not inform
the court about the effect of its decision on incentives for
biotechnology firms to engage in research and development for
biologically modified food products, the impact on competitors who
may appreciate the access to the previously protected material but
lament the loss of protection in the field, or the consequences for the
food supply, international trade, and the economy.
The
fundamentally public nature of these cases means that individual
plaintiffs will rarely illuminate all of the public consequences of a
policy for a court. As such, the inherent structure of the courts as
forums to decide adversarial disputes makes them ill-suited to
consider such a multitude of narratives.
Beneath the specter of the rush to the courthouse, each potential
plaintiff must weigh its compelling narrative against the possibility
that someone else has a better, or worse, or more representative, or
less representative, case. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the first
litigation on an issue may preclude all others from having the
opportunity to present their narratives. Thus, an adverse decision
against the first litigant might preclude substantive review of the realworld impacts on other stakeholders, even when those stakeholders
have compelling narratives or experience the effects of the challenged
protection in significantly different ways.
After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a different set of
plaintiffs (an organization seeking to make a free digital library of
orphan works and an organization maintaining a free digital archive
of creative works, principally films) brought another challenge to the
Copyright Term Extension Act.158 In Kahle v. Gonzales, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the motion to dismiss the case because the Supreme
Court had already held the statute constitutional in Eldred v.

158. Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
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Ashcroft.159 In dismissing the case, the courts did not consider the
real-world impacts of the CTEA on the Kahle plaintiffs. Specifically,
the free nature of plaintiffs’ services, the opening of broad public
availability to works that might otherwise remain obscure or difficult
to access, and the large reliance on orphan works distinguished the
Kahle case from Eldred.160 The Kahle plaintiffs could not continue
their businesses and comply with copyright law at the same time
under the CTEA, while the Eldred plaintiffs would merely have had
to make royalty payments—a real impact, but not a devastating one.
The preclusive effect of Eldred meant that the courts did not get to
consider the impact of the CTEA on entities that faced significant
real-world consequences and that had an arguably more sympathetic
case. The Kahle case provides an example of the finality tendency
since the result in Eldred served to foreclose any further consideration
of the issues.
These concerns matter because we want courts to make decisions
based on real-world consequences. In the context of public interest
intellectual property cases, however, the decisions discussed in this
article indicate that those real-world consequences do not impact the
substantive analysis. The courts consider whether a policy violates
the Constitution or a statute, and the real-world impact of that policy
makes no difference to the validity of the policy. The decision in
Myriad did not turn on the nature or extent of injuries suffered by
Doctor Ostrer.161 The Federal Circuit discussed his activities in
connection with the jurisdictional analysis, but did not mention him at
all in the analysis of patent eligibility.162 The Supreme Court’s
decision mentioned him only briefly in the factual summary and in a
footnote acknowledging that he had standing.163 Likewise, neither
Eldred nor Golan examined the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs in the
considerations of constitutionality.164 Thus, viewing these cases from
this perspective, the rush to the courthouse matters not because of the

159. Kahle, 487 F.3d at 698 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221).
160. Id.
161. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
162. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1302, 1315-22 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
aff’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013).
163. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2115.
164. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884-94 (2012) (lacking discussion of injuries
suffered by plaintiffs in consideration of validity of statute); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-222
(lacking discussion of injuries alleged by plaintiffs in the assessment of the constitutional
claims).
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need to present the plaintiff with the most sympathetic facts, but
rather the need to find the strongest advocate to argue the case.
This observation about the lack of relevance of the facts of the
individual plaintiffs in the substantive analysis counsels that the
standing analysis should focus on the adequacy of representation to
the exclusion of any consideration of injury. Keeping in mind the
finality tendency that public interest intellectual property litigation
will usually offer the final word on the policy issues, effective
representation will serve the courts and society in general better than
a plaintiff with sympathetic facts. In Organic Seed Growers, the
seeds may not have had as direct an impact on the organic farmer
plaintiffs as on other stakeholders, but the organic farmers had
qualified counsel.165 The case presented legitimate questions about
the proper scope of patent protection for seeds, none of which any
branch of government will likely take up since the court declined to
extend standing.166
6. The Courts Function as Courts, Not Policy-Making
Bodies
The standing doctrine limits the role of the courts to adjudicating
“concrete and particularized” disputes for the additional reason that
the other branches of government have the responsibility to formulate
and enact broadly applicable policies.167 The Constitution established
a system of separation of powers that reflects the structural decision
to vest certain decision-making power in the political processes.168
Under this view, common problems shared by large groups properly
belong to the popularly elected legislative and executive branches.169
The courts cite standing as a reason to decline to adjudicate “abstract
questions of wide public significance” and “generalized
grievances.”170
165. Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Corp., 178 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
166. Id.
167. Fletcher, supra note 52, at 222 (“The purposes include . . . preventing the antimajoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policy-making functions of the popularly
elected branches.”).
168. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (“This is an essential limit on
our power: It ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to
elected representatives.”).
169. Elliott, supra note 54, at 462 (“Cases are sorted on a rough democratic theory: if an
injury is shared by a large group of people, some cases suggest, such a group can and should
take its problem to the legislature or the executive branch, not the courts.”).
170. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
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Since courts usually do not inquire whether a plaintiff has
alleged that it suffered an injury shared by many, the courts have not
approached this consideration with consistency.171 As an example of
the challenges arising from the application of this principle, consider
Aharonian v. Gonzales.172 In this case, the Northern District of
California dismissed the claim that software code qualified as an
“idea” (and therefore exceeded the scope of protection afforded under
copyright law) because the claim constituted a “generalized
grievance.”173 At the same time, the court declined to dismiss other
claims on standing grounds and proceeded to address the
constitutionality of the definiteness of terms applicable to copyright
protections in source code.174 In the court’s view, even though a
pronouncement on constitutionality would affect many people, such
claims did not constitute generalized grievances, since “standing
depends only on whether plaintiff has alleged a concrete, particular
harm.”175 From the plaintiff’s perspective, all of the claims arose
from a “concrete, particular harm”—the protections for source code
resulted in high costs for his business. On the other hand, all of the
claims also addressed restrictions applicable equally to all members
of the public.
This tension in Aharonian reflects the lack of consensus on the
proper allocation of authority among each of the branches for
deciding policy. The legislature offers many advantages as a policysetting body. Public policy formed through deliberative democracy—
the theory that lawmakers should develop public policy based on
conversations about the public interest, and not solely on the
legislator’s own viewpoint or the interests of a particular group—
allows for the contribution and consideration of multiple viewpoints
on the public interest, as society comes to reasoned consensus on
public policy formulated in furtherance of the public good.176
179 (1974).
171. Elliott, supra note 54, at 481 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998)).
172. Aharonian v. Gonzales, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1449 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting motion to
dismiss claims challenging the validity and scope of copyright protection in software source
code).
173. Id. at 1454.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1453 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1992)).
176. John J. Worley, Deliberative Constitutionalism, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 431, 442 (2009)
(“In deliberating about matters of public concern, democratic citizens and their elected
representatives must distance themselves from their own personal or group interests and
impartially adopt laws, policies, and institutions that promote the interests of all citizens.”);
Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB.
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Deliberative, representative, majoritarian bodies like Congress allow
stakeholders to gather, present their interests, discuss and debate
policy options, attempt to influence their elected representatives, and,
after receiving feedback from the other constituents, moderate their
proposals to make them more broadly attractive and inclusive of other
stakeholders.177
The process of enacting legislation through
committees and the full bodies in two chambers of Congress takes
time, but that time allows for broad participation and consensus
building. The public accepts the legitimacy of laws because they
have engaged in the deliberative process.178
Accordingly, courts often defer to the legislature as the best
forum for resolution of these questions.179 Otherwise, prompt access
to the courts by ideological plaintiffs makes the courts into policymaking bodies equal to the executive and legislative branches.180 The
Supreme Court has characterized the term length of copyrights as a
policy decision that rests with the legislative branch. “Given the
authority we hold Congress has, we will not second-guess the
political choice Congress made between leaving the public domain
untouched and embracing Berne unstintingly.”181 The Court declined
to “reject the rational judgment Congress made” in how it thought
AFFAIRS 371, 377 (2004) (“So one reason deliberative democrats emphasize deliberation is so
that citizens’ judgments on laws and policies can be informed by consideration that all can
reasonably accept in their capacity as democratic citizens.”).
177. William N. Eskridge Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1295 (2005) (“When
advocates must articulate and defend their proposals to a variety of perspectives and not just to
their core supporters, they are more likely to moderate and universalize those proposals.”).
178. Freeman, supra note 176, at 380 (“What matters most for deliberative theorists then is
not hypothetical, but actual deliberation and agreement among free and equal citizens under the
realized ideal conditions of deliberative democracy. This is a necessary (if not also sufficient)
condition for the legitimacy of laws and the proper exercise of political power.”).
179. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (holding that section 514 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, which met treaty obligations and revived copyrights in certain foreign
works which had fallen into the public domain, did not violate the First Amendment or the
Copyright Clause); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 667-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“[T]he establishment of a mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books is a matter more suited
for Congress than this Court.”), class certified and motion to dismiss denied, Nos. 05 Civ. 8136
(DC), 10 Civ. 2977 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2012), and class certification rev’d, 721 F.3d 132
(2d Cir. July 1, 2013) (No. 12-3200-cv), remanded to No. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
14, 2013) (dismissed on fair use grounds).
180. Jenny L. Maxey, A Myriad of Misunderstanding Standing: Decoding Judicial Review
for Gene Patents, 113 W. VA. L. REV. CIR. 1033, 1068-69 (2011) (recognizing that the slow and
deliberative nature of the legislative process is better suited to complex, multi-stakeholder issues
like patentability of gene sequences); Scalia, supra note 59, at 893 (discussing separation of
powers function of standing).
181. Golan, 133 S. Ct. at 887.
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best to meet its Constitutional role to “promote the Progress of
Science.”182 Such policy decisions do not fall to the courts for
resolution.183 Whether or not the Congress made a wise decision, the
Court should only determine whether it made a constitutional
decision, and in the matter of copyright term lengths, Congress has
great discretion under the Constitution.184 Along those lines, the
Southern District of New York rejected a proposed settlement
regarding the digitization of books because that policy decision rested
with the legislative, as opposed to the judicial, branch.185
Yet, the structure of the legislature does not always foment the
development of public policy through robust deliberation. The
political branches may not provide adequate venues to address widely
shared injuries, particularly when a large number of individuals suffer
an injury so small or impersonal that it would make them unlikely to
engage in political action to address the problem.186 A government
based on deliberative democracy carries the additional risk of factions
dominating the deliberative process and losing focus on the public
interest.187 This concern has borne itself out in the copyright
legislation enacted by Congress over the years. Copyright law has not
emerged from debate among legislators, but rather from negotiations
between different industries with interests in the copyright regime. 188
Thus, although the mid-1990s witnessed two significant pieces of
legislation impacting the term of copyright—the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act189 (the subject of Golan v. Holder) and the Copyright
Term Extension Act190 (the subject of Eldred v. Reno), both of which
expanded the scope of protection for copyrights—the lack of

182. Id. at 889.
183. Id. at 894 (“Nor is this a matter appropriate for judicial, as opposed to legislative
resolution.”).
184. Id. (“The judgment §514 expresses lies well within the ken of the political branches.
It is our obligation, of course, to determine whether the action Congress took, wise or not,
encounters any constitutional shoal.”).
185. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d at 667-78 (“[T]he establishment of a
mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books is a matter more suited for Congress than this
Court.”).
186. Siegel, supra note 109, at 101-02 (discussing the imbalance of incentives).
187. Stephen L. Elkin, Thinking Constitutionally: The Problem of Deliberative
Democracy, 21 SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POL'Y 39 (2004) (discussing the challenges of how a
deliberative democracy will actually work).
188. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 53 (2001) (observing that Congress
adopted legislation emerging from industry negotiations).
189. Act of Dec. 8, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 3809.
190. Act of Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827.
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engagement with multiple constituencies (including consumers,
artists, performers, libraries, retailers, and others) led to a failure of
widespread buy-in of the policy. Unsuccessful at either gaining an
audience in Congress or obtaining legislation consistent with their
interests, some stakeholders turn to the courts, as witnessed in Golan
and Eldred.191
Besides allowing certain interest groups to dominate public
policy formation on some issues, Congress has also declined to
address certain issues at all. This lack of action has led to some
stakeholders asking the courts to fill that void. For example, the
recent copyright litigation has touched on the issue of orphan
works.192 Although the Copyright Office issued a report on orphan
works in 2006 with draft legislation, Congress has not taken action
beyond subcommittee hearings in 2008.193 Likewise, Congress has
not responded to the other concerns about terms extensions or the
public domain raised in suits like Eldred v. Reno and Golan v.
Holder. Perhaps this lack of action signals that Congress remains
committed to expansion of copyright protection, or perhaps it reflects
that these stakeholders lack access to Congress.
In the patent realm, a common refrain of criticism rings these
days against patent “trolls” or “non-practicing entities”.194 These
patent holders do not produce goods or exploit their inventions
themselves, but rather seek to extract damages from others, many of
whom use the patent unwittingly.195 Critics decry the unfairness of a
191. Elliott, supra note 54, at 491 (“Thus, dismissing a case because an injury is widely
shared, on the assumption that the group will mobilize to obtain redress through the political
branches, does not take into account the political reality that some groups have more access than
others.”).
192. Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007) (brought by non-profit organizations
that provided the public with access to orphan works that otherwise would remain hard to
access).
193. The "Orphan Works" Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement made by Marybeth Peters, Reg. of Copyrights), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON
ORPHAN WORKS (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
194. James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REG. 26, 35
(2011) (arguing that patent trolls have resulted in the loss of over half a trillion dollars in wealth
over between 1990 and 2010); Markus Reitzig et al., On Sharks, Trolls, and Their Patent Prey –
Unrealistic Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed,” 36 RESEARCH POL'Y
134, 134 (2007) (arguing that patent “trolls” or “sharks” hold research and development groups
captive).
195. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L.
REV. 1991, 2009 (2007) (“Defining a patent troll has proven a tricky business, but that does not
mean the problem does not exist.”); Reitzig et al., supra note 194, at 134 (arguing that patent
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system that allows these patent trolls to profit while they inhibit
innovation by legitimate enterprises.196 Echoing the frustration of
industry with these patent trolls, politicians have decried the bullying
by these entities and the negative effects on growth and innovation.197
While legislators have introduced bills that would seek to curb abuses
arising from patent troll litigation, they have not introduced bills that
would fix the policies or procedures that give rise to these troll
patents.198 Namely, owners of patents have the right to exclude others
from using the protected inventions. If legislators believe that trolls
assert claims based on overbroad, invalid, or “bad” patents, they
should make this material ineligible for patent protection, change the
standards for patent examination, or allocate more resources to the
USPTO to support more thorough review. Instead, the bills
addressing the excesses of patent trolls propose changes to pleading
standards, different venues for dispute resolution, and shifting of
attorney fees back to an unsuccessful plaintiff.199
The executive branch offers some advantages for setting policy.
As a democratically elected branch it can claim to represent the will
of the people. The executive agencies have expert, specialized staff

“trolls” or “sharks” hold research and development groups captive).
196. David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 2013, at BU1 (profiling Eric Spangerberg, who sued 1,638 companies between 2008 and
2013, and noting that U.S. companies spend $30 billion every year on patent litigation); Patent
Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-trollvictims (last visited July 15, 2013).
197. Press Release, John Cornyn, U.S. Senator, Cornyn Introduces Bill to Curb Abusive
Patent
Litigation
(May
22,
2013),
available
at
http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=082eaec
c-1983-41a7-b656-156c1b4b77cb (“[A]busive patent litigation, led by a growing number of
‘patent trolls’ in search of a quick payday, threatens the innovation patents were created to
protect.”); Press Release, Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator, “Patent Trolls” Preying on New
York’s Technology Industry with Unwarranted Lawsuits (May 2, 2013), available at
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/record.cfm?id=341612 (observing that patent trolls
cost operating companies $29 billion in suits in 2011).
198. John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 2111, 2130
(2007) (“[E]nergy might be better directed to devising alternatives or improvements to today’s
costly court proceedings—such as better initial screening of patents by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, more effective reexamination proceedings, or a new brand of administrative
‘opposition’ proceedings.”).
199. Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringements, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199
(2013) (creating cause of action by defendant in bad-faith patent lawsuit against party asserting
the patent); Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing limits
on discovery, heightened pleading standards, and shifting of attorney fees); Saving High-Tech
Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013) (allowing
successful defendant to recover attorney fees); Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013,
H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013) (setting heightened pleading standards).
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with deep policy knowledge.
Yet, these agencies have limited authority and resources. The
USPTO lacks a mechanism to solicit and weigh public input on the
extension of protection to every new category of technology.200
Further resource constraints limit the extent of the review which the
USPTO undertakes for the validity of patents, which means that some
issues will not arise until competitors uncover prior art or the patentee
begins exercising its interpretation of its rights.201 Moreover, the
Copyright Office and the USPTO offer mechanisms to challenge
registrations under only limited circumstances, such as identification
of an incorrect owner on a copyright registration or reexamination of
a patent based on prior art not considered during the initial review.202
If someone wishes to challenge a registered patent or copyright on
other grounds, including that patent or copyright protection should not
extend to an entire category of materials, or that the registrant asserts
rights beyond those afforded by the registration, these agencies do not
have the authority to grant relief. The challenger must petition the
courts, which provide a “reasonably efficient and conclusive forum
for the adjudication of validity.”203
The courts offer certain other advantages for resolving policy
questions. In this venue, litigants may question “the presumptive
legitimacy of majoritarian outcomes” and advocate for policy changes
contrary to the views of the majority or the most powerful interests.204
The anti-majoritarian nature of the courts makes them the forum in
our tripartite government to seek redress by those who did not find
success in a political branch.205 Narrow approaches to standing may
200. Kane, supra note 40, at 731 (2004) (“From a policy perspective, no mechanism for
public input exists when the PTO readily embraces new technologies as patentable subject
matter and issues patents that may elicit public concern and criticism, such as DNA gene
patents. The public interest concerns of nonapplicants cannot be channeled into any meaningful
engagement with the PTO.”).
201. Kitch, supra note 30, at 345-46 (arguing that the courts do better than the Patent
Office at making determinations on validity).
202. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-07 (2012) (setting forth provisions for seeking reexamination of
any patent claim based on prior art); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510 (2013); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FORM
CA FOR SUPPLEMENTARY REGISTRATION, (2006); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 8
SUPPLEMENTARY COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION (2013).
203. Kitch, supra note 30, at 345-46 (arguing that the courts do better than the Patent
Office at making determinations on validity).
204. Hershkoff, supra note 156, at 163 (arguing that courts act to undo democratically
made decisions when the democratic process excludes affected groups or results in an outcome
that impacts such groups in ways that do not align with the public interest set forth in the
Constitution or statutes).
205. Elliott, supra note 54, at 491 (“Thus, dismissing a case because an injury is widely
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therefore serve to exclude the disadvantaged from the political
branches as well as the courts.206 If the standing doctrine blocks all
individuals who could conceivably raise a particular issue from
proceeding as plaintiffs, then the doctrine does not just keep out
individuals, but rather entire issues as well.207 Someone wishing to
challenge the validity of a patent often has no forum to seek relief
other than the courts.208 An injury remains an injury, whether
widespread or unique, and the injured party needs to have an authority
to petition to redress the injury.209 For this very reason, Congress
enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act to open the courts to consider
patent validity challenges.210 The Supreme Court set forth a flexible
and open test in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. to make it easier
for challengers of allegedly invalid patents to access the courts.211
Litigation also engages the public in policy debates in ways that
legislative or executive action does not. The initiation of the litigation
introduces the assertions of the plaintiffs to the public discourse and
helps to evolve society’s collective opinion.212 The Court may lead
the way in recognizing a principle which the rest of the government
will embrace over time.213 When the legislature or the executive
shared, on the assumption that the group will mobilize to obtain redress through the political
branches, does not take into account the political reality that some groups have more access than
others.”); Scalia, supra note 59, at 894 (“There is, I think, a functional relationship, which can
best be described by saying that the law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional
undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the
majority . . . .”).
206. Nichol, supra note 51, at 304 (“The malleable, value-laden injury determination has
operated to give greater credence to interests of privilege than to outsider claims of
disadvantage.”).
207. Scalia, supra note 59, at 892 (discussing the effect of the standing doctrine on the
allocation of powers).
208. La Belle, supra note 45, at 85 (discussing the role of the courts for patent validity).
209. Elliott, supra note 54, at 481 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)) (“[T]he
fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an injury is widely
shared . . . does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such
an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an ‘injury in fact.’”).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2013); La Belle, supra note 45, at 73 (discussing purpose of
declaratory judgments for patents).
211. La Belle, supra note 45, at 85 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118, 127 (2007)).
212. Hershkoff, supra note 156, at 164 (finding that public law litigation “forms part of
what sociologists call the new social movements in which participants contest public meaning”).
213. Id. (easing the other institutional actors to internalize new norms); Eskridge, supra
note 177, at 1300 (“Because of inertia built into our representative democracy, the law does not
always change as social norms move from one stage to the next.”). In the past, the Supreme
Court has led the way on social issues. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(ordering school desegregation before legislatures made such changes).
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branch fails to act, litigation may offer the only alternative to prompt
change.214 Adjudication by the courts may highlight issues not raised
to the legislative branch or given inadequate attention in that venue,
and open the door for Congress to take action based on the court’s
informed opinion.
If no venue exists for resolution of these issues by the
government, then private parties will set de facto norms. The more
powerful interests will have the leverage to set the terms of
engagement. The government should step in when such terms do not
reflect the public interest.
7. Efficient Use of Scarce Judicial Resources
Finally, by restricting access to the courts, the standing doctrine
aims to cap the size of dockets, thereby making more efficient use of
the limited resources of the federal courts.215 The structure of the
federal courts lends itself best to resolution of discrete disputes
between small numbers of parties and should devote its resources to
these tasks. Thus, for example, consideration of the multiple public
interests that would inform the propriety of patent protection for
broad categories of inventions makes inefficient use of court
resources.216
This rationale presumes that the courts will assess the standing of
the parties as a preliminary question using a straightforward test that
yields consistent results.217
Contrary to these presumptions,
assessments of standing often require the parties and the courts to
invest significant resources. The plaintiff may need to gather and
submit evidence to establish that it has suffered an injury.218 An
214. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, Meaningful Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary
Role of the Courts, 85 NO. CAROL. L. REV. 1467, 1526-29 (2007) (stating that court actions have
produced meaningful changes in education funding; even the filing of a complaint has prompted
the executive branch to take action).
215. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000) (“Standing
doctrine functions to ensure, among other things, that the scarce resources of the federal courts
are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have a concrete stake.”); Scalia, supra note 59,
at 891 (“Standing, in other words, is only meant to assure that the courts can do their work well,
and not to assure that they keep out of affairs better left to the other branches.”).
216. Maxey, supra note 180, at 1060.
217. Nichol, supra note 51, at 309 (“Standing is meant to be a mere preliminary
jurisdictional inquiry. . . . Plaintiffs are either hurt or they are not. Harms are either real or
fanciful. They are concrete or abstract, individual or shared, objective or subjective, particular
or common, hypothetical or imminent.”).
218. E.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(reviewing twenty plaintiffs’ submitted declarations and other evidence of injury), aff’d in
relevant part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
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appeal on a determination of standing requires the resources of
another court. If the appellate court reverses a dismissal based on
lack of standing, the trial court must commence the substantive
adjudication of the case, perhaps months or years after the plaintiff
initiated the case. Consider the Myriad litigation. The plaintiffs filed
suit in 2009 and the Federal Circuit did not issue its decision on the
appeal on the standing issue until 2011, two years later—two years
that might make a real difference to a cancer patient seeking to benefit
from additional research on or diagnostics with the BRCA genes.219
Dismissal of cases due to lack of standing may yield other
inefficiencies. Consider the scenario of a party seeking adjudication
by the courts before it undertakes a potentially infringing action.220 If
the court dismisses the case on grounds of standing, the litigant must
decide to either undertake the infringing activity or forego the
proposed use. If the interested party decides to commence use,
litigation may follow, but such litigation merely delays adjudication
of the issues on the merits. The user will assert a counterclaim or
defense equivalent to its affirmative claims in the initial action. The
courts could have decided those issues in the first action rather than
expending its resources on the standing analysis.
On the other hand, if the party foregoes the contemplated use,
the public will lose out on potentially beneficial new material.
Declining to hear the merits of a case based on standing has the same
practical effect as issuing a decision upholding the patent validity and
avoids the challenging policy questions of the proper extent of patent
protection. For example, invalidation of seed patents could result in
lower food prices since farmers would not have to pay to use seeds
each year. Or, invalidation might result in less investment by
biotechnology firms in seed innovations since they will not benefit
from the patent monopoly to recoup the research and development
expenses. Additionally, forestalling the invalidity question might
curtail third-party derivative developments based on those seed
patents, which remain subject to the control of the patent holder.
Thus, while denial of standing may result in an incremental reduction
in the use of court resources in the short-term, declining to decide the
issues in the case may yield inefficiencies from a broader societal
perspective.

(2013).
219. Id.
220. Golden, supra note 198, at 2126-31 (discussing the options of a potential infringer
based on the costs associated with either a license or litigation).
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
Any attempt to mitigate the problems arising from adjudication
of public interest intellectual property cases in courts requires
attention to the stakeholder access problem. Given the limitations in
the structure and resources of the federal courts, requiring or
encouraging massive multi-party litigation does not present a
workable solution. Instead, a mechanism to seek and assess public
comment could exist in the agencies responsible for intellectual
property—the legislative branch’s Copyright Office and the executive
branch’s USPTO. The agency would compile the results of the public
comments and present those comments and its recommendations in a
report to the court. This process would allow for stakeholder input,
provide the court with broader inputs on the public interest, and
inform the legislature of issues that might require legislative action.
The procedure could work as follows. Upon the initiation of a
public interest intellectual property case, the court would approve a
question or questions for public comment. The parties could move to
dismiss the action before commencement of the public comment
period, but not on the grounds of standing, since the results of the
public comment period would inform the issues of injury,
representativeness, and effectiveness of representation in the standing
analysis. For instance, questions for the cases discussed in this
Article might include the following:
1. How do patents in seeds contribute to the progress of
science?
2. Do patents in seeds encourage or discourage more
innovation for the public to enjoy?
3. How do the copyright terms in the Copyright Term
Extension Act contribute to the progress of the arts?
4. Do copyright terms of this length result in the creation of
more works for the public to enjoy?
The agency would take the charge from the court and initiate a
public comment period. It would identify stakeholders—owners of
impacted property rights, competitors, consumer advocacy groups,
public domain advocacy groups—and invite them and anyone else in
the public to submit comments on the action. These agencies could
efficiently identify and contact impacted stakeholders since they
already know and engage with their stakeholder communities.
In a somewhat analogous procedure currently employed for
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another type of action with multiple stakeholders, the federal courts
may direct counsel in class actions to distribute notice of the action to
class members.221 Class counsel generally knows the members of the
class and has an incentive to find the members in order to achieve a
result that addresses the shared claims of the entire class. In public
interest intellectual property cases, the stakeholders do not belong to
one class with shared beliefs. In fact, some stakeholders will hold
viewpoints on the policy contrary to those of the plaintiffs. Thus, the
plaintiffs do not have an incentive to locate all of the impacted
stakeholders. The court itself does not know who other than the
litigants may speak to the effects of the policy. If the court
administered the public comment period, the proceeding could
become quite adversarial and might resemble a bankruptcy hearing
with multiple stakeholders claiming rights in the property. The
agencies, however, work with the stakeholders on a daily basis.
The agency would take sixty days to identify stakeholders and
open the issue for public comment for an additional sixty days. After
a further sixty days, it would issue its report. The public-comment
period would thus delay the litigation. Yet, formation of public
policy merits expenditure of time and other resources to understand
the policy choices and their impact on the stakeholders. This
procedure offers a relatively efficient way to assess those options.
Considering that the litigation discussed in this Article often lasted
many years, a period of six months at the beginning of the litigation
would not delay the matter substantially. The benefit of gathering
valuable information at the start of the litigation outweighs the harm
of any delay.
Further, the existence of a forum for stakeholders to advocate
their interests to the government would counteract the binary
tendency. When the government inquires how a policy impacts a
stakeholder, the government acknowledges that those views matter.
The policy options expand beyond completely private rights or
completely public rights to total-welfare-enhancing models, for
example, compulsory licensing or limited fair use exceptions for
research. Even if the final policy ends up aligning with one of the
two extremes, the engagement of the affected communities will lead
to more buy-in by the stakeholders.
The mere filing of one of these disputes might prompt the
initiation of policy development by the executive or legislative

221.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
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branch. This may, in turn, lead to suspension of the action as the
parties participate in the policy development through the other
branches.
As a result of the initiation of the public comment period,
additional stakeholders will learn of the litigation. They then might
voluntarily join as parties to the litigation. This development would
offer the advantage of providing the court with more viewpoints and
more briefing on the issues. On the other hand, the addition of
multiple parties could make the litigation unwieldy. However, that
possibility exists even today since stakeholders already have the
option to attempt to join as parties. In the event of a massive multiparty litigation, the court would still have the option to dismiss parties
for lack of standing. If it does so, it should pay particular attention to
the adequacy of representation, since, as discussed in this Article,222
the injuries suffered by the particular plaintiffs do not change the
answers to the substantive questions. For those parties who do remain
in the case, the court could suggest that parties with overlapping
interests combine their resources and a designated representative
would submit briefs and motions on behalf of all of the parties sharing
the same interests.
The agencies would consider the comments in light of the
questions posed by the court as well as their general duty to consider
the public interest in their work.223 This obligation towards the public
interest extends to both the public benefits of expanding protection
and the public harms of contracting protection. The agency would
compile the comments with these considerations in mind and issue its
own recommendation based on these inputs and its expert opinion.
The court could give as much or as little weight to the agency
report as it deemed appropriate based on the circumstances of the
case. In more discrete cases, the additional information would most
likely confirm the positions advocated by the parties to the suit. In
more complex cases with wider effects, the contributions from the
public would illuminate the broader set of real-world consequences.
Nonetheless, the report might not have any impact on the questions
the court would need to decide. For instance, the opinions of various
constituencies that longer copyright terms would not result in the
production of more works for the public to enjoy would not dispose of
the constitutional question of Congress’s authority to set term
222. See discussion supra Part III.B.5.
223. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Board has a duty to
obtain the views of the affected public.”).
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lengths.224 The report, however, would nonetheless aid the court in
understanding the public impact of the legislation. Perhaps more
importantly, the report would inform the executive and legislative
branches of the public’s views of the policy and if they should
consider changes to the policy. The public-comment period thus
would serve the important role of engaging constituents in the policymaking process.
Given the potential value of the public-comment period, it might
seem appropriate to require the agencies to initiate this mechanism
even if litigation has not commenced. This Article has focused on the
challenges of litigation, and this proposal specifically addresses those
challenges by providing a mechanism to inject the policy implications
into the litigation. The court’s questions define the purpose and scope
of the public-comment period. Without this direction, the agencies
would not have direction on when to initiate this process, and would
often lack the authority to implement any policy changes without new
legislative action. Thus, policy recommendations submitted to
Congress sua sponte will likely fall flat.
After the court issues its decision, the legislative or executive
branch may seek to change the policy within the bounds set forth by
the court. These branches will benefit from the court’s analysis, the
public input, and the agency’s recommendation. The stakeholders
will have engaged with the policy issue through their participation in
the public-comment period and, having ownership in the issue, may
seek to influence the other branches to change the policy.
Without this process, stakeholders will face many instances
where no branch considers the issues raised by the litigants.
Significant stakeholders should have the opportunity to present their
concerns and have the government consider those inputs, particularly
in the face of a substantial policy shift. This mechanism would open
up that opportunity and thereby counteract the finality tendency.
This Article has argued that the current interaction of standing
with public interest intellectual property cases leaves some issues
without a forum for resolution. This proposal does not guarantee that
a governmental body will resolve the issue of orphan works, for
example. But, the process would engage the stakeholders and force

224. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (upholding Copyright Term Extension
Act not because such a term would or would not result in the production of more works, but
rather because a term of life plus seventy years met the constitutional restriction to “limited
times”).
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the agency to take a position on the issue.225 It would also serve to
develop a record of the consequences of current policy on orphan
works. Perhaps, these steps would suffice to move the policy process
along so that the executive or legislative branch would change the
policy.
Even if the government did not change a policy based on these
inputs, the opening up of the policy process to multiple stakeholders
would change the dynamics away from the private capture of public
interests. This Article has discussed public interest intellectual
property cases that define the disputes as control over the property by
the purported rights holder or by the plaintiff. The rights holder seeks
to retain exclusive control, while the plaintiff seeks to wrest such
exclusivity from the rights holder in favor of free access. When
multiple stakeholders participate in the policy process, the framing of
the issue shifts, focusing instead on how to enhance the welfare of all
of the stakeholders. They all benefit from development of the
material and no one group of stakeholders will dictate control of the
material.
CONCLUSION
The role of the courts matters in disputes over intellectual
property policy, because the tension between private rights and public
rights will not go away. Technological and scientific innovation
multiplies the volume of new information goods at a breakneck rate,
but this pace of development also makes it more challenging for
rights holders to protect their goods. The need to stay ahead of the
curve and offer a competitive advantage creates pressures to stake
rights as broadly as possible.226 Less than a month after the Supreme
Court invalidated Myriad’s patents in the isolated BRCA1 and
BRCA2 gene sequences, Myriad filed multiple suits against
laboratories offering testing for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene
sequences.227
Organizations like the Electronic Frontier

225. The Copyright Office has taken the lead on the orphan works issue and developed
draft legislation, which has not moved out of committee. The "Orphan Works" Problem and
Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Reg. of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html;
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (Jan. 2006). Litigation with stakeholder
engagement might provide more impetus for Congress to respond to the proposal.
226. Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 698-99 (“[N]obody wants to be the last one
left dedicating findings to the public domain.”).
227. Complaint, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Gene By Gene Ltd., No. 2:13-cv-
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Foundation and the Public Patent Foundation have dedicated
themselves to fighting this trend and have robust litigation
programs.228 With Congress unable or unwilling to address many of
these issues, organizations like this will continue to seek resolution of
these issues in the courts.229
Without some modification to the process for resolving these
disputes, the trend toward private capture of public interests
will intensify. Each side will initiate litigation to seek to enforce
the rights or to invalidate those rights. The binary tendency
will reinforce this trend as the victories in litigation encourage
the parties to try to move the line in the sand. Under-organized
or under-resourced constituencies will watch from the sidelines as
the courts mediate the balance between private rights and the
public domain.
The finality tendency will continue to leave
certain issues undecided and impose opportunity costs on
those considering using or adapting the material, leading to
foregone developments which the public might have enjoyed.
Enhanced engagement with a wider range of stakeholders,
possible through the public-comment period, will help to change

00643-EJF (D. Utah July 10, 2013) (including Myriad Genetics, Inc. as one of five plaintiffs
alleging that defendants’ genetic testing infringes multiple patents); Complaint, Univ. of Utah
Research Found. v. Ambry Genetics Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS (D. Utah July 9, 2013)
(including the same).
228. About EFF, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, www.eff.org/about (last visited
July 24, 2013) (“From the beginning, EFF has championed the public interest in every critical
battle affecting digital rights. . . . EFF fights for freedom primarily in the courts, bringing and
defending lawsuits even when that means taking on the US government or large corporations.”);
PUBLIC PATENT FOUNDATION, www.pubpat.org (last visited July 24, 2013) (“Undeserved
patents and unsound patent policy harm the public by making things more expensive, if not
impossible to afford; by preventing scientists from advancing technology; by unfairly
prejudicing small businesses; and by restraining civil liberties and individual freedoms. PubPat
represents the public’s interests against undeserved patents and unsound patent policy.”).
229. General media sources decry the recent overall inaction by Congress. E.g., Sean
Sullivan, Everything You Need to Know about the Politics of the Student Loan Fight,
WASHINGTON
POST
(July
1,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/wp/2013/07/01/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-politics-of-the-student-loan-fight/
(observing that gridlock characterizes Congress and led to a spike in student loan rates); 94
Percent of Americans Say Congressional Inaction Harming Economy, NO LABELS (Dec. 1,
2011),
http://www.nolabels.org/press-releases/no-labels-poll-94-percent-americans-saycongressional-inaction-harming-economy. Specifically regarding public interest intellectual
property issues, Congress has failed to act on the issue of orphan works although the Copyright
Office drafted legislation intended to provide incremental relief for the problems resulting from
the inability to locate the owners of copyrighted works. See The “Orphan Works” Problem and
Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Reg. of Copyrights), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html.
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the approach of intellectual property policy to greater focus on the
public interest.

